

# Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher

by  
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Beginning in the late seventeenth century, as a reaction to a growing faith in the autonomy of human reason, Protestants were divided into two basic camps. On the one hand, there were the Christian enthusiasts. The widespread popularity of religious enthusiasm, which began from within the Evangelical (Lutheran) and Reformed (Calvinist) communions in the Netherlands and Germany, had by the early eighteenth century developed into a major fountain of Protestant influence, the Pietist movement. Springing up from the ministry of two Lutherans, Johann Arndt (1555-1621) and Philip Jacob Spener (1635-1705), Pietism emphasized the simple Christian life, personal devotion to the Redeemer, and the inner experience of the Holy Spirit. Its pre-Reformation roots can be traced to the work of Geert de Groot and Thomas à Kempis of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries respectively. As a movement it refused to meet rationalism on its own terms, but insisted instead on a supra-rational basis of Christian truth. Although Pietism was an evangelistic movement, it was not apologetic. It extended the promise of spiritual discernment to the converted, but it was not prepared to make a defense to the unconverted.

On the other hand, there were the Christian rationalists, who, in turn, can easily be subdivided into two distinct groups, the orthodox and the heterodox. The former argued that the truth of the Scriptures and, therefore, of the traditional Christian faith, could be defended on the basis of reason and empirical science. These were the ideological descendants of Wolff and Locke, apologists for the reasonableness of Christianity, and among them were the fundamentalists of their day. The latter type of rationalists were really not a group at all, but were instead a significant number-intellectuals and often professors, impressed with the ideas of Voltaire and Diderot or Toland and Tindal—who were each prepared to amend the Scriptures and formulate a highly individual *credo* in an attempt to salvage a more or less natural Christianity. Among these were the Christian Deists.

The Schleiermacher family was typical in that, by the mid-eighteenth century, it had accumulated experience from both sides of the Protestant divide. Friedrich Schleiermacher's paternal grandfather was an enthusiast who made the unfortunate choice of attaching himself to a charismatic preacher by the name of Eller. This mystic and apocalyptic visionary managed to attract a following during the 1730s and 40s, in the same years that the Wesleys and George Whitefield were drawing thousands to Methodism. When the Ellerian movement disintegrated as a result of the misconduct of its founder, Daniel Schleiermacher himself suffered disgrace and was accused of sorcery. He escaped the civil authorities by fleeing to Arnheim in 1749. His son, Gottlieb Schleiermacher, understandably developed a suspicion of and distaste for religious enthusiasm, and yet, having adopted rationalism in its place, he could never find contentment. Although he became a servant of orthodoxy in the Reformed Church, Pastor Schleiermacher preached as a skeptic to believers. Following what he understood to be the example of Jesus—as currently being taught at the University of Halle by Lutheran theologian Johann Salomo Semler (1725-91)—he *accommodated* his discourse to the notions and prejudices of his believing audience. All the while, he himself, for at least twelve years, was “a real unbeliever.” Writing to his son Friedrich, he suggests that his own mind slowly accepted the message of his sermons, until he was ultimately persuaded that what he had been preaching for so long was in fact true.<sup>1</sup> His example might seem to offer a perfect illustration of Archbishop Whately's maxim, “He who does not begin by preaching what he thoroughly believes, will speedily end by believing what he preaches.”<sup>2</sup> However, it may also be the case that the pastor gave too much credit to the rhetorical power of his own preaching, and that, if we are to credit any earthly influence for the conversion of his thought, we might look toward the pious influence of the his wife, Friedrich Schleiermacher's mother.

### Lessing on Mt. Pisgah

In this rational dissatisfaction with orthodoxy conjoined with a felt dissatisfaction for any proffered substitute—this sense of “Wandering between two worlds, one dead, / The other powerless to be born”<sup>3</sup>—Gottlieb Schleiermacher had not been alone. But, if we may slightly alter these well-worn lines of Matthew Arnold's and say instead, “The other *destined to soon* be born,” then we shall have before us not the religious despair, but rather the anxious optimism of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-81). It was Lessing's belief, decades before it was Carlyle's, that there were essential religious truths beneath the faded and worn garments of Christian orthodoxy. These were garments that had once served the purpose of expressing the

dignity of the underlying truths, but they could do so no longer. A diverse group of professorial tailors had responded to the need of the moment by mending the old garments, but Lessing would not be deceived into mistaking a patchwork for new clothes. Thus, he opposed both the rationalist orthodox and the rationalist heterodox. Nevertheless, if one group dared to assert its truth over the other, Lessing would rush to defend the position that was attacked. Orthodox Christianity was still the best extant expression of religious truth, and yet heterodox Christianity correctly perceived that orthodoxy was no longer viable.

Lessing reasoned that, if Christianity was to survive, it had to reform itself from within. No philosopher from the university could give Christianity the revivifying touch. A new Luther was needed, a doctor of theology who would not simply diagnose the disease, but who would prescribe and administer the cure as well. Why wouldn't this theologian come forward? For what dire predicament was he waiting? Impatient, Lessing attempted to force the epiphany of the hero by publishing a number of essays—anonymous “Fragments” Lessing called them—purported to have been discovered by himself in the Duke of Brunswick's library at Wolfenbüttel. Actually, Lessing had been well acquainted with the now-deceased author, a Deist by the name of Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768), and it is more than likely that he received these literary remains from the surviving daughter, with whom he was in correspondence. The Reimarus essays were unique in that, whereas many speculative historians had attempted to reconstruct in a rationally satisfactory manner the history that is recorded in the Gospels, Reimarus made the attempt as a naturalist historian who was thoroughly conversant with the sources and endowed with a deeply critical mind. Lessing recognized in these works a certain inflammatory quality, and he reasoned and hoped that, were he to set fire to the temple, one heroic priest or pastor might come forward to quench the flames.

Albert Schweitzer observes that Lessing “recognised that the introduction of the historical element would transform and deepen rationalism.”<sup>4</sup> This is, no doubt, true, but it is also misleading. It must not be ignored—in fact it must be emphasized—that Lessing's genuine hope was that “the historical element” would force the transformation of *Christianity*. As Karl Barth argues, “Lessing was certainly interested in Reimarus as the provider of an opportunity in the face of which the belief in revelation, in so far as it was not yet surpassed, must prove itself in its temporary truth and validity.”<sup>5</sup> Thus, Lessing began the publication of the Wolfenbüttel “Fragments” in 1774. The seventh essay, entitled “The Aims of Jesus and His Disciples,” was published in 1778. Reimarus herein argued, on purely historical grounds, that Jesus had not attempted to do away with the Jewish religion and that it was the result of later circumstances that his disciples broke with the Jewish Law.

The argument raised an outcry, and the censor's office at Brunswick put a stop to the publication of the series.

What frustrated and angered Lessing was not that the Lutheran and Reformed theologians disagreed with Reimarus. He, too, disagreed with Reimarus's conclusions. What Lessing found so incomprehensible in the debates that followed, principally with Semler, was that the theologians entirely failed to grasp what was being required of them. Rather than putting out the fire, they were attempting to convince the worshipers that the temple was fire-resistant. Even the critically-minded Semler maintained that all Christian ministers must be required to maintain the public profession of traditional doctrine. Lessing, on the other hand, recognized that a simple defense of Christianity based on the validity of Scripture or tradition could no longer be sufficient. He argues, "The Christian traditions must be explained by the inner truth of Christianity, and no written traditions can give it that inner truth, if it does not itself possess it."<sup>6</sup> Here Lessing reveals the mission of his theological hero. His task would be to place Christian theology on a new footing, on the foundation of its "inner truth." E. B. Pusey, writing in 1828, made this interesting remark:

I know not any man whose scepticism gives one more pain, excites more regret, than that of Lessing. His work manifests a conscientious desire after truth, a struggle to extricate himself from his difficulties; he first pointed out the impregnable bulwark of religion against all scientific objections, which has since been philosophically justified, that the foundation, the *original* seat of religion is in the feeling, not in the understanding.<sup>7</sup>

Lessing did not live to witness this paradigm shift in the philosophy of religion. He died in 1781, the year of the last *auto-da-fé* of the Spanish Inquisition.<sup>8</sup> The law of the letter was fading in the bright sunlight and clarity of a new day, and like Moses on the heights of Mount Pisgah, Lessing surveyed the promised land from afar. There, before him, as in a pillar of cloud, he perceived the power of the spirit in the progress of the human race. Barth notes that a passage in the works of the Renaissance philosopher Jerome Cardan appears to have made a great impression on him. It read, "In the year 1800 a great change will come about in the Christian religion."<sup>9</sup>

### **Schleiermacher's Early Education**

Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, born on the 21st of November, 1768, was ten years old when the seventh of Reimarus's "Fragments" was published. Because his

father was in service as a chaplain to a regiment in Silesia, he had already moved twice and had received much of his education from the instruction of his parents. For a brief period he had attended a school operated by a friend of his father's, a fellow chaplain, who taught Schleiermacher the fundamentals of Latin. It was during this time that he earned a reputation for cleverness and, in his own estimation, became somewhat conceited. His mother—Schleiermacher recalled—a deeply religious woman, “endeavoured, by acting upon my religious feelings, to change my pride into gratitude towards God.”<sup>10</sup> There can be no doubt that his mother occupied a profound place in his emotional and religious development, so much so that his conception of piety would always be closely associated with the traditionally feminine virtues.

It was not until his twelfth year that Schleiermacher attended a boarding school. This was at Pless in Upper Silesia. Here he came under the care of a pupil of Johann Ernesti, the Lutheran theologian and professor whose principal work, the *Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti* (1761), argues that Scripture, to be understood, must be interpreted in accordance with rules of philology and grammar instead of by dogmatic presuppositions. This early education left an indelible imprint upon Schleiermacher. The seed of hermeneutics was planted in rich soil, and throughout his life it would be nourished until it bore much fruit.

When Schleiermacher was fourteen his parents, while on a journey, visited an educational institution established by the Moravian Brethren at Niesky in Upper Lusatia. The Moravians represent, historically, the continuation of the Bohemian Brethren after they had received a Pietist “renewal” at Herrnhut, a town founded by Count Zinzendorf for his followers in 1722. They are, therefore, often referred to as Herrnhuters, although they style themselves “Evangelical Brethren.”<sup>11</sup> John Potter, Archbishop of Canterbury from 1737 to his death in 1747, held conferences with Zinzendorf with a view toward the establishment of an Evangelical Alliance and, subsequently, was a great supporter of the Moravian Church, holding “that it was apostolic and episcopal, and maintained no tenet that was opposed to the Thirty-nine Articles.” Moreover, Thomas Wilson—the Bishop of Sodor and Man whose *Maxims of Piety and of Christianity* (posthumously published in 1781) was so highly esteemed by Matthew Arnold—accepted, in December 1749, the title of “Honorary President of the Reformed Section in the Moravian Church.”<sup>12</sup>

What Gottlieb Schleiermacher found “most satisfactory”—as he expressed it in a letter to his brother-in-law, Professor Samuel Stubenrauch—was, that “the one great and important object of man, reconciliation with God, is here, as in all Moravian establishments, founded upon the only true basis, the bloody sacrifice of Christ.”<sup>13</sup> Pastor Schleiermacher and his wife decided that they would protect their

children from the rationalist contagion, and in March of 1783 they packed off their two sons, Friedrich and Carl, and their daughter Charlotte. As Mrs. Schleiermacher prepared her children for their departure, she said to her husband, “Now that all the children are going to the Brethren, I shall be of little more use here, so I may as well lay me down and go to sleep.”<sup>14</sup> Nine months later, the children received the news of their mother’s death.

As much as the young Schleiermacher must have been saddened by this loss, his letters and Autobiography testify of an issue that appeared to have been more troubling to his sensitive consciousness. In every discourse and lesson of the Moravians there was interwoven the doctrines of the natural corruption of humanity and of the supernatural means of deliverance. These doctrines were by no means unfamiliar to the young pupil, but never before had they been emphasized so strongly and with such earnestness of conviction. Furthermore, every Moravian was expected to be able to speak of these doctrines from the vantage-point of having the experiential assurance of saving grace, of having obtained redemption through Christ from a former condition of corruption. Schleiermacher was not sure that he could lay claim to such experience, although he anxiously sought it, and this lack of assurance resulted in “manifold internal religious conflicts.”<sup>15</sup>

The experience of friendship, however, brought relief and the sort of comfort to Schleiermacher that he could never attain through Moravian doctrine. His closest friend, Albertini, transferred with him in 1785 from the pädagogium at Niesky to the seminary at Barby. So remarkable was the companionship that existed between these two that they were known within the Moravian community as Orestes and Pylades.<sup>16</sup> At the seminary they were joined by a third, a dissatisfied seeker with whom Schleiermacher felt a unique sympathy, Okely.<sup>17</sup>

Together, this trefoil, united in the tension of their pursuit for spiritual peace, sought consolation through intellectual means. They were disappointed, however, in that, although the seminary provided them with a decent library, its policies forbade the reading of the most modern literature and criticism, and Germany was at that time producing some of its greatest creative and critical minds. The three friends could not be satisfied with the restrictions placed upon them: “We trespassed indeed inasmuch as we obtained books through means of forbidden correspondence and by secret and circuitous routes, but it was only for Wieland’s poems and Goethe’s Werther that we pined—it was for our feelings only that we sought food from without.”<sup>18</sup> The feelings, however, are not so disjoined from the mind, and young Schleiermacher’s letters indicate that he, presumably with his friends, had also been reading and reflecting upon Moses Mendelssohn’s *Morning Lessons or Lectures on the Existence of God* (1785), a vindication of Lessing’s “refined pantheism.”

## Turmoil and Transition

Neither Schleiermacher's feelings nor his intellect could obtain satisfaction within the Moravian Brotherhood. Despite all of the warnings from his father of the poisonous tree of knowledge and "that dangerous love of profundity which would lure you towards it,"<sup>19</sup> Schleiermacher understood that it was not truth but ignorance that stood to lose ground by the accumulation of knowledge. He was determined to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, and having eaten, his eyes were opened. Subsequently, he had to be expelled from the Moravian garden of innocence. He was given three months to obtain a situation elsewhere—more time, admittedly, than Adam had been granted, but then again, Adam had the whole world before him. Under these circumstances, young Schleiermacher had to write what was, quite likely, the most difficult letter of his life. On 21 January 1787, he wrote hesitatingly, tearfully, attempting in vain to prepare his father for the confession of his religious doubts. Finally, the words came forth:

I cannot believe that He, who called Himself the Son of Man, was the true, eternal God: I cannot believe that His death was a vicarious atonement, because He never expressly said so Himself; and I cannot believe it to have been necessary, because God, who evidently did not create men for perfection, but for the pursuit of it, cannot possibly intend to punish them eternally, because they may have not attained it.<sup>20</sup>

Knowing of Gottlieb Schleiermacher's long struggle out of an unhappy and secret rationalist heterodoxy into a slightly more gratifying orthodoxy, knowing of his wife's piety and their shared purpose to do what they could to ensure the security of their children's faith, we can, surely, sympathize with the emotional distress that overwhelmed him in the reading of his son's letter. We can, perhaps, after a brief and undisturbed period of reflection, understand his reaction, but Pastor Schleiermacher, whose own past experience should have made him utterly sympathetic to his son's plight, was too disturbed to pause for calm reflection:

Oh, thou insensate son! who has deluded thee, that thou no longer obeyest the truth, thou, before whose eyes Christ was pictured, and who now crucifiest him? . . . And if the departed watch over us, oh! what a cruel disturber of the tranquility of your blessed mother have you become. . . .  
Alas! into what a state of delusion has the wickedness of your heart plunged you! . . .

And now, O son, who I press with tears to my sorrowful heart! with heartrending grief I discard thee, for discard thee I must, as thou no longer worshippest the God of thy fathers.<sup>21</sup>

Beneath the cruelty of the accusations and rejection, there is the love of a father whose strongest desire is for the happiness, here and hereafter, of his son. Schleiermacher perceived this, even through his tears, and it is this, no doubt, that saved him from inconsolable despair:

Oh! could you picture to yourself the distressing, the miserable condition of your son! I was but too wretched beforehand, and now your letter has more than doubled my wretchedness. However, I recognize in it the tender heart of a father who still loves his apostate son and leaves no means untried to bring him back into the former path.<sup>22</sup>

He pleaded with his father to send him to the University of Halle, where he could advance in the study of theology and know more perfectly the strengths and weaknesses of heterodox doctrines. If he was ever to return to orthodoxy, he argued, it could only come about as the result of a thorough knowledge of every alternative. Only then could he weigh every position and assess the relative value of each. He was convinced, even then, that a healthy and strong religious faith cannot grow while compressed into a defensive and isolated posture. His father gave his consent and made arrangements for Schleiermacher to board with his uncle, Stubenrauch, who, although now retired from his professorship, still lived in the university town of Halle.

### Theology at Halle

The University of Halle, founded in 1694, had once been the center of the Pietist movement. Its first three theological professors had all received their training under Spener, either in the *Collegia Biblia* of the University of Frankfurt or at Dresden, and during its first thirty years, with the matriculation of 6,034 theological students, Halle seemed, as it were, a living fountain from which all of Germany might draw.<sup>23</sup> The vivifying spirit that imbues institutions of reform is, however, but the passing freshness of a winter's thaw, and as Pietism approached mid-summer, its doctrines stiffened into dogmas, and the fountain dried. But its anti-rationalist agenda continued, virtually unchecked, until the reign of Prussia's philosopher-king, Frederick the Great (1740-86). Then, appointments were made to the faculty such as would result in greater intellectual diversity and theological debate. One of these

appointments was that of Cartesian and Leibnizian philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who—on account of his unbounded confidence in reason—had been expelled from Halle in 1723. Frederick II not only reinstated the mathematics professor, but expressed the fullness of his disdain for Pietism by promoting Wolff into the position of Vice-Chancellor of the University. At Halle, and in fact throughout eighteenth-century Protestant Prussia, Wolff introduced a systematic philosophy that, before Kant, went virtually unchallenged. Another of these appointments was that of Karl Friedrich Bahrtdt (1741-92), who had formerly served as Associate Professor of Sacred Philology at Leipzig. A scandal resulted in his resignation from this post in 1766, and it was only some time afterwards that Frederick was able to grant him a position at Halle.

Apparently, Bahrtdt began his work here as a rationalist of the orthodox stamp, but during the publication of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* he lost his faith in miraculous revelation. He was an eloquent and inspired speaker, and his lectures on “The Plans and Aims of Jesus” attracted huge audiences. According to Bahrtdt, Jesus had been inducted into a secret Order of the Essenes. This Order taught him of Socrates and Plato, and inspired in him a longing to emulate the great philosopher-martyr. They introduced Jesus to Luke the physician and stage-managed the alleged miracle cures, including the final great event, the resuscitation of Jesus himself after his supposed death on the cross. Jesus’s disciples, unaware of the machinations of the Order of the Essenes, reported all of the events of their Master’s ministry in perfectly good faith. Thus, the Essenes, by making use of the youthful enthusiasm and charisma of Jesus, and by taking advantage of the ignorance of the common people, were able to pass on to the Jews a higher order of ideas.<sup>24</sup> It was a stunning argument, but the theological faculty at Halle were not, for the most part, favorably impressed. Upon the death of Frederick in 1786, the year before Schleiermacher arrived at Halle, Bahrtdt was dismissed from his post. The professor’s ideas and influence could not, of course, have been so summarily dismissed, and there can be little doubt that, if the young philosopher at Barby had not already heard news of the controversy, he soon was made fully conversant in its issues.

Another prominent rationalist theologian at Halle was J. S. Semler, who retained his position as Professor of Theology from 1753 to 1793, the year of his death. No other faculty member at Halle exercised as much influence upon Schleiermacher than Semler. Like Reimarus, in applying a critico-historical method to the study of Scripture, he often reached unorthodox conclusions—in some cases even anticipating the later thought of Tübingen professor F. C. Baur (1792-1860). However, he stood firmly upon a traditional Christian faith, and as we have seen, upon the publication of the *Wolfenbüttel “Fragments,”* he became Lessing’s most

worthy opponent. It was certainly not without Semler's approval that Barhdt was given the boot.

A word more needs to be said about theological training at Halle. In Prussia at this time, there were more clergymen than the parishes could accommodate. Often, graduates in theology would temporarily occupy themselves in teaching, either in a public or private capacity. It was clear to Von Zedlitz, Prussia's Minister of Culture, that every theological department, including the one at Halle, must have a Professor of Pedagogy. In 1782 he found his man at Göttingen. This was Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), the famed philologist known to every student of Homer. It was he, says Mark Pattison, who "seized, more completely than any one since the first teachers of the Renaissance, that side of classical studies by which they are qualified, more completely than any other studies, to form and inspire the opening mind." In his letter of appointment, Von Zedlitz wrote to Wolf, "Do your best to remove from Halle the only reproach to which it is open,--that it is not a school of philology."<sup>25</sup> By 1786, the year before Schleiermacher's matriculation, Wolf's influence upon the university had already prevailed in the founding of a department of philology.

Even apart from the influence of Bahrtdt and Semler, the scientific approach to texts that was engendered by the new school of philology made Halle a center for rationalist theology for forty years. Not until 1826, when Friedrich August Tholuck (1799-1877)—who had sat at the feet of Schleiermacher in Berlin—was called to occupy Halle's chair of theology, did the university begin to return to its Pietist roots. By then, the perceived task of Pietism had changed. No longer was the modern force of mind to be feared and contended against. Tholuck, maintaining the intellectual candor that he had esteemed in the lectures of Schleiermacher and Neander, would then strive to show by reason's light that reason's foundation is faith.

### **First Studies in Spinoza and Kant**

Thus, in 1787, the University of Halle offered Schleiermacher access not only to the full range of theological debate, but also revived his philological interests and nurtured his talent in hermeneutics. Moreover, when he returned from his classes to the home of his uncle, he would find there a capable and concerned study partner. With Stubenrauch, Schleiermacher first read Jacobi's "On Spinoza's Doctrine" (1785). Jacobi provided selected passages from Spinoza's work, and it was through these quotations and Jacobi's criticism that Schleiermacher acquired a partly accurate introduction to Spinoza's thought.<sup>26</sup> The earlier correspondence with his uncle suggests that, as a result of the "Pantheist Controversy" between Jacobi and

Moses Mendelssohn, Schleiermacher had already become aware of Spinoza as a philosopher deserving consideration. Although Spinoza received a fairer assessment through Jacobi than he had through Henri Bayle, both of these reviewers concluded that Spinozism implied atheism. Mendelssohn, in response to Jacobi, tried to remove the stumbling-block from Spinozism, but his “refined” Spinoza seemed to Jacobi like a Christ without the cross, neither real nor relevant.

Schleiermacher followed his reading of Jacobi by picking up a copy of the just-published work by Johann Gottfried Herder, *God, Some Conversations*. This work introduced a variation of Spinozism that was to have some influence upon the later thought of Schleiermacher. Herder described an organic universe which functioned as a system of intricately related microcosms within macrocosms. Spinoza’s *substance* or ultimate reality was now redefined as *substantial force*. It is not merely *what is*, but it is also *what creates and sustains*; it is a living system, a living God, but, like Spinoza’s God, non-anthropomorphic. God is Substantial Force, the Force in which all other forces have their being, the very source of the system that is the World.

Before Schleiermacher could arrive at his own unique interpretation of Spinoza, he would first have to depart from Spinoza for several years and devote himself, instead, to the study of the most important contemporary philosopher, the Professor of Logic at Königsberg, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Shortly after Schleiermacher’s arrival at Halle, Germany experienced the first wave of Kantianism, and not only Schleiermacher, but his father and uncle as well, were captivated by the new “Critical Philosophy.” When, in 1787, Pastor Schleiermacher wrote, urging his son to study Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena of Metaphysics*, Schleiermacher informed his father that he had already studied the *Prolegomena* with his two friends at the Moravian seminary, but he acknowledged that his understanding of this work was hindered by not having first read the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He promised to read it during the Michaelmas vacation.<sup>27</sup> By 1789 he had studied not only this first *Critique*, but also the *Critique of Practical Reason*.

It was primarily with this latter work of Kant’s that Schleiermacher found fault, and so there followed a succession of critical writings, from 1789 to 1793, on the Kantian philosophy. He argues that Kant is mistaken when, in his argument for the existence of God, he takes as an *à priori* truth that virtue must be rewarded by happiness. According to Kant, since virtuous conduct is often left unrewarded in this life, the fact that the moral consciousness demands this reciprocity must be taken to imply a Judge who will ultimately grant virtue its just desserts. Schleiermacher suggests that what the moral consciousness looks forward to is the act of doing one’s duty, the virtuous conduct itself, not any hypothetical reward that may or may

not follow the conduct. The “highest good” is, then, not the conjunction of virtue and pleasure, but rather it is that which is realized in the act of obedience to one’s sense of duty. Kant had also argued for immortality on the basis that the moral consciousness recognizes a duty to be morally perfect, even though such perfection cannot be attained during a finite period. Schleiermacher responds by noting that the function of the moral ideal is to serve as a motive force stimulating humanity toward the pursuit of perfection. To the extent that it operates as a motive force, its purpose is fulfilled. As he had remarked to his father several years earlier, it is the pursuit and not the attainment of perfection that gives value to life.<sup>28</sup>

Schleiermacher’s chief work of this period, also developed in reference to Kant, is his essay of 1792, “On Freedom.” Kant had argued for a transcendental freedom, the freedom to always overcome feelings and desires that oppose the moral consciousness. Schleiermacher rejects this notion of freedom since it implies that there is a radical dualism of mind and body. Even so, he refuses to go to the other extreme by suggesting that mind can be reducible to matter. He, instead, offers a “determinism” that can be contrasted with the doctrine of fatalism. Whereas *fatalism* posits an inexorable causal nexus in which the subject is always predetermined, *determinism* represents humanity as in possession of conflicting motive forces or desires that, if sufficiently equal in potency, allow the freedom of alternative possibilities. Moral choices are, thus—and in contradistinction to Kant—*not* made in opposition to desire; rather, desire itself occupies a role in moral discernment. As Julia Lamm notes, Schleiermacher, in turning away from Kant, “opts instead for his own appropriation of Spinoza’s qualified understanding of freedom.”<sup>29</sup> “On Freedom” marks the beginning of Schleiermacher’s return to Spinoza, which is crucial for Schleiermacher’s development in that—as we shall see—it also marks his transition towards a reaffirmation of religion.

## Truth and Freedom

Before we proceed to a consideration of Schleiermacher’s early appropriation of Spinoza, let us turn back momentarily to the outward life, since what is outward always determines to some extent the influences that contribute to the making of the inward life. When, in the summer of 1790, Schleiermacher obtained his license to teach and preach for the Reformed Church, he came under the supervision of the future bishop, Pastor Friedrich Samuel Gottfried Sack (1738-1817), Chaplain in Ordinary to the King as well as Court and Cathedral Preacher in Berlin. Sack was a friend of Schleiermacher’s uncle, Stubenrauch, and was determined to extend every

kindness to his young protégé. Through Sack, Schleiermacher received the offer of a situation as tutor in the family of Count Wilhelm Dohna of Schlobitten.

To the Dohnas Schleiermacher went, and with them he remained for three years. Of this time, he later reflected, “Upon the whole, the numerous family occupied me in various ways, so that less time than I might have desired was left me to pursue my own studies.”<sup>30</sup> Be that as it may, it was in the home of the Dohnas that he developed his understanding of Kant. In fact, it was during a short vacation from Schlobitten in May of 1791 that Schleiermacher was able to pay a brief visit to Königsberg and spend half an hour in the company of Kant and other professors.<sup>31</sup> It was also here, in the home of the Dohnas, that Schleiermacher returned to Spinoza—not this time as a student, nor as a disciple, but nevertheless with a full conviction that in Spinoza lay the key to correcting the errors he discerned in Kant.

In his *Soliloquies*, Schleiermacher reflects upon a moment of epiphany that took place probably soon after his appropriation of Spinoza:

With proud joy I still recall the time, when I discovered humanity and knew that henceforth I should never lose it. The sublime revelation came from within; it was not produced by any code of ethics or system of philosophy. My long quest which neither this nor that would satisfy was crowned in one moment of insight; freedom dissolved my dark doubts by a single act. I can affirm that since then I have never forsaken my true self.<sup>32</sup>

This “sublime revelation” or “highest intuition” of Schleiermacher’s is “that each man is meant to represent humanity in his own way, combining its elements uniquely, so that it may reveal itself in every mode.”<sup>33</sup> In this apprehension, in which the thought of Giordano Bruno is modified by Spinoza, Humanity, ideally or Platonically conceived, occupies the position of the *One*, and the conglomeration of individual persons is the *All*. Every person is a mode of humanity, each representing it equally but none perfectly. Moreover, as the One is present in the All, so is the essence of the One present in each of its modes, so that Schleiermacher now rises to a sympathetic affinity with every other person, recognizing himself in every other mode of the One while also recognizing all other persons within himself.

This intuition or epiphany comes to Schleiermacher as a source of liberation. No longer can he feel shame for identifying within himself the germ of a feeling that would grow to fruition in another person. In order to know himself he must know what humanity is in all of its diversity and then identify how, through a process of determination, this humanity has taken on an individual expression in himself—

where it has been nourished, where it has been stunted. Several years later, in a letter, he would write, “*How much, and what, is not required . . . to see a man exactly as he is! He who would do so must not only know himself, but he must have found everything within himself.* True innocence and simplicity will never attain to such knowledge of human nature.”<sup>34</sup> Because the germ of every vice and virtue is within him, he senses his alternatives, but knowing what is his individual essence, his true self, he *chooses* to perfect this self.

This sense of oneness with humanity could not prevent discord. Count Dohna and Schleiermacher never arrived at a firm agreement regarding the limitations of a tutor’s authority, and there were arguments. Finally, in June of 1793, Schleiermacher’s position within the Dohna family came to a rather abrupt termination, and our twenty-four-year-old philosopher found himself, once more, “as a child in the house of my kind uncle.”<sup>35</sup> He did not remain there for long. Throughout August, he was in Berlin visiting with Sack, hoping that other opportunities for employment would present themselves. Arrangements were made, and by mid-September he had been hired to teach at an institution in Landsberg for the training of schoolmasters. Both Sack and his new employer, Dr. Gedike, wanted Schleiermacher to come to a final decision as to whether he would pursue an ecclesiastical or academic career, but he refused to limit his opportunities. Despite his academic propensities, his newly developed post-Kantian Spinozism made possible the deeply religious life that he had often sought but could never experience within the Moravian Brotherhood. There was no longer any real possibility of denying his religious calling.

### **Post-Kantian Spinozism**

During the winter of 1793-94, immediately before taking his final set of theological exams, Schleiermacher reread Jacobi’s “On Spinoza’s Doctrine” and put together his own series of notes under the title “Spinozism.” Then, he immediately set to work on a “Brief Presentation of the Spinozistic System,” in which he alternates between analyzing Spinoza’s teaching and defending it against Jacobi’s (mis)representation. Whereas Jacobi had compared Spinoza to Leibniz, Schleiermacher compares him to Kant. Spinoza, says Schleiermacher, is allied with Kant against rationalism and materialism. However, the Spinozan system is actually more coherent than the Kantian, but only after it has been translated into the Kantian “critical” philosophical language.

This correlation between Kant and Spinoza had already been observed by a number of other post-Kantian Romantics, including Johann Fichte and Friedrich Schelling; however, whereas these thinkers attempted to “correct” Kant by

eliminating the notion of the thing-in-itself and developing in its absence idealist philosophies, Schleiermacher arrives at a *critical realism*. That is, although Schleiermacher agrees with Kant's *critical* recognition that time and space are categories of human perception and that we do not apprehend that which is without us as it truly is, he also agrees with Spinoza's *realism* in that he recognizes that human beings are finite and limited modes of the infinite and that we do not contain the infinite. Even so, we can obtain an immediate apprehension of the infinite through feeling or intuition.

Schleiermacher, in his "Brief Presentation," arrives at all of the essentials of his post-Kantian Spinozism that would ultimately, in 1799, find their fullest expression in *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers* (hereafter referred to as *Speeches*). Julia Lamm identifies the "four defining characteristics" of his Spinozism as "an *organic monism*, an *ethical determinism*, a *critical realism*, and a *nonanthropomorphic view of God*."<sup>36</sup> As with Spinoza, it was the last of these four characteristics that was to raise an outcry among the orthodox. But, before we move on to the *Speeches*, let us return momentarily to Schleiermacher's outward life.

### Berlin Society

Although circumstances had maintained for many years a physical distance between Schleiermacher and his father, intellectually and emotionally they had grown nearer to each other. Their shared interest in Kant, Spinoza, and Plato enlivened their correspondence. Schleiermacher, whose former familiarity with Plato had been indirect, filtered for the most part through Shaftesbury and Herder, was only beginning to read Plato from the Greek when, in 1794, his father requested "a condensed view of the Platonic system written by yourself."<sup>37</sup> Although Plato would occupy a prominent place in Schleiermacher's thoughts for the rest of his life, the son had not the opportunity to respond to his father's wish, for only a few weeks after having written this letter, Gottlieb Schleiermacher died.

The intimate details of Schleiermacher's life between October 1794, and August 1797 are, for the most part, lost to us. Frederica Rowen observes, in her *Life of Schleiermacher* (1860), that none of his letters "are in possession of his family, and even those to his sister Charlotte seem to have been destroyed."<sup>38</sup> We do know, however, that Schleiermacher, as early as 1794, had been introduced into the Wednesday Society,<sup>39</sup> a social and intellectual circle in Berlin that prospered around the cultured and hospitable Henrietta Herz, a Jewish widow. In the Berlin of this time, culture virtually belonged to the great Jewish houses. Schleiermacher would

later explain this social phenomenon to Charlotte: “They are by far the richest non-noble families in this city, and almost the only ones that receive company, and in whose circle, owing to their numerous foreign connections, you may meet strangers of all ranks; therefore, whoever likes to mix in good society without much ceremony, gets introduced to these families.”<sup>40</sup> Because the husbands of these Jewish women generally devoted themselves to commerce early in their lives and obtained financial success before marrying—and then married women much younger than themselves—it was their wives who had both the leisure and the means to devote themselves to culture and society. The regular members of the Herz circle included, at this time, the brothers Alexander and Wilhelm von Humboldt as well as the eldest son of Wilhelm Dohna, Count Alexander von Schlobitten, who was later to be Prussia’s Minister of State.

Schleiermacher himself, however, did not become a regular member of the Wednesday Society until 1796, after he exchanged his position in Landsberg for an appointment as chaplain in the establishment of the Charity in Berlin. When Friedrich Schlegel, the young literary critic, arrived in Berlin in the summer of 1797, Mrs. Herz astutely recognized that he and Schleiermacher would profit from each other’s conversation and, so, brought the two into association. Schleiermacher had, much like Erasmus, devoted his youth to solitary study after the first blossoms of friendship had withered, even though he had the greatest capacity for friendship. Consequently, he had often been depressed and—again, like Erasmus—had taken comfort in the writings of satirists, including Lucian. As a result, says Horace L. Friess, in a somewhat clinical diagnosis, “A slight touch of disillusionment had taken a permanent place in Schleiermacher’s character.”<sup>41</sup> Now, however, a new and exciting period was opening up to the young theologian, one in which he would explore all of the possibilities and meanings of friendship and would receive, in return, the vital touch of God’s spirit where it was most needed, so that his entire personality would attain a definite maturity.

Writing again to his sister, this time with evident enthusiasm, Schleiermacher introduces her to his new friend. Schlegel, he says, is possessed not only of a variety of knowledge and originality of intellect that “far surpasses all others” in the Society, but what is ever rarer, he possesses this in combination with an absence of artificiality and childlike spontaneity. He continues,

I have always felt the want of a companion to whom I could freely impart my philosophical ideas, and who would enter with me into the deepest abstractions. This great void he has filled up most gloriously. To him I can not only pour out what is already in me, but by means of the

exhaustless stream of new views and new ideas which is ever flowing into him, much that has been lying dormant in me, is likewise set in motion. In short, as regards my activity in the world of philosophy and literature, my more intimate acquaintance with him forms an epoch.<sup>42</sup>

The “motion” that Schleiermacher here speaks of is the activity of the mind; his “activity in the world” required some coercion before it too could be set in motion.

As he expressed in one of his *Soliloquies*, “Leisure is my dear divinity; by her favor man learns to understand and to determine himself.” Moreover, “there is a two-fold vocation of men on earth,” which marks “a great dichotomy in human nature.”<sup>43</sup> One may either pursue a life devoted to outward creativity, the prerequisite of which is having already arrived at a cohesive and stable position in regard to one’s development, or one may persevere in the process of assimilation, refusing to allow one’s ideas to settle into a definite shape. The creative artist halts his development in order to express what can never be more than an approximation of his feeling for reality; the one who pursues perfection, however, continues to develop and to attain a higher intuition, but fails to express the intuition so as to stimulate and educate others.

On Schleiermacher’s twenty-ninth birthday, he was surprised by the arrival at his apartment of Schlegel, Dorothea Veit (the daughter of Moses Mendelssohn), and Mrs. Herz, along with Alexander Dohna and his younger brother. In chorus, they all demanded that Schleiermacher write books and, together, were able to extract a promise from him that he would write something original—“a promise,” he wrote Charlotte, “that weighs heavily upon me, as I have not the least desire to be an author.”<sup>44</sup>

One month later, in December 1797, Schlegel moved into an apartment adjoining Schleiermacher’s, and their shared friends began to refer to this union as a marriage, unanimously agreeing that the physically small, sensitive, and gentle Schleiermacher must represent the wife. However, the two were not so well united as this analogy would suggest, and what they were able to derive from each other’s company was limited by the diversity of their temperaments. Schlegel, inspired by his youthful grandiose dreams of intellectual and academic achievement, was far more the man of action than Schleiermacher, but he was also far less attentive and receptive to the realm of feeling, and Schleiermacher realized that he could understand and regard his new friend at a much deeper level than could ever be reciprocated. In the Age of Sentimentality, when the very idea of friendship seemed to imply emotional investment, candor, and open displays of affection, this was an unpromising assessment of their relationship.

Even so, as we look back upon Schleiermacher and evaluate him by his intellectual achievement, it is easy to conclude that Schlegel contributed to their friendship just what Schleiermacher was in most need of at this time—practical direction and incentive. In December, exactly one year after they had begun to share rooms, Schlegel wrote a letter to Novalis, the contents of which give us a good indication of the topic and substance of his conversations with Schleiermacher at this time: “I am planning to institute a new religion, or rather, to help in its annunciation. . . . If Lessing were still alive, I would not need to begin this work.” Schlegel conceived of this new religion as a “synthesis of Goethe and Fichte,” and Schleiermacher responded in such a collusion of thought and feeling that made inaction an impossibility. As Schlegel noted in his letter, Schleiermacher, “a born critic of anything having to do with the Bible, . . . is writing a work on religion.”<sup>45</sup> It is this responsive work that became the seed out of which the *Speeches* developed.

Although Schleiermacher valued his morning conversations with Schlegel—after being awoken at about half past eight by the clattering of his friend’s coffee cup—Schleiermacher would gradually come to spend more time with Mrs. Herz. His letters of this time indicate that what he felt in the company of Mrs. Herz was a level of affinity that made physical attraction irrelevant. Schlegel recognized that, to some extent, he was being replaced by Mrs. Herz in his friend’s affections and was jealous; but, at the same time, he himself was being pulled in other directions. His older brother, August Wilhelm von Schlegel, had come to Berlin, and the two began the publication of their manifesto of German “Romanticism,”<sup>46</sup> *Das Athenäum* (1798-1800). Also, Friedrich Schlegel’s friendship with the married Dorothea Veit was rapidly becoming something other than mere friendship and would soon necessitate his departure from Berlin. Yet, it was at this time, even as the tensions between their relationships began to pull them apart, that the combined encouragement of Schlegel and Henrietta Herz moved their common friend to compose some “Fragments” for the *Athenäum* and finally induced him to take up a more ambitious project.

### **The *Speeches***

As a minister and as a member of the Wednesday Society, Schleiermacher was profoundly aware that the two basic camps into which Christianity had been split as a reaction to and compromise with rationalism had led to a general misapprehension about the nature of religion. Many of his cultured friends and acquaintances had come to associate religion with either anti-intellectualism or the intellectual defense of a creed and code of behavior. They had, subsequently, become despisers of

religion, and so Schleiermacher wanted to show them, as Barth states, “that by virtue of their education they are enabled and summoned to understand the nature of religion better than it has been understood previously; and further that it is worthwhile taking note of the nature of religion.”<sup>47</sup> Therefore, when Schleiermacher received a call to Potsdam, in early February of 1799, in order to temporarily occupy the position of court preacher, he used this time apart from his friends to compose, for their benefit, his series of five discourses known as the *Speeches*.<sup>48</sup>

By February 22, Schleiermacher had sent anonymously the first and second Speech to his superior, Sack, to receive his official *imprimatur* as censor. In a letter of this date to Mrs. Herz, Schleiermacher makes no attempt to disguise his anxiety: “The first discourse may please him, but how will it be with the conclusion of the second?”<sup>49</sup> Before we concern ourselves with Sack’s reaction, let us consider the content of these initial and most significant Speeches.

The first of the *Speeches* is simply entitled “Defense.” Schleiermacher begins by establishing two points—first, that it is possible that he himself may be so constituted that he can interpret “the Deity and His works” with greater clarity than most others; second, that a defense of religion is anything but an argument for conformity. The perfection of the organic world consists in the fact that all possible combinations of synthesis between two opposing impulses is actually present in humanity. On the one hand, the human soul “strives to establish itself as an individual,” drawing all things to itself and absorbing them into its own being. On the other hand, there is “the longing to surrender oneself and be absorbed in a greater, to be taken hold of and determined.” Those people who succeed in suppressing both impulses in order to attain “an unattractive equilibrium” are less capable as interpreters of either God or the World than those who have an excess of one impulse to the exclusion of the other. But, “Deity at all times sends some here and there, who in a fruitful manner are imbued with both impulses,” and these persons have the gift to serve as interpreters and to reconcile that which is divided.<sup>50</sup>

Schleiermacher proceeds to eliminate opposing and erroneous definitions of “religion.” Religion is not to be found in literature, neither is it to be confused with its historically conditioned forms. Furthermore, religion is not to be thought of as a prop for morality. Those who seek to defend religion and morality in this way actually succeed in degrading both, for although both are needed, neither is so weak as to require the other for support. To understand what religion is one must consider it “from the centre outwards,” beginning with its inward quality. “I ask, therefore,” says Schleiermacher to the cultured despisers of *so-called* religion, “that you turn from everything usually reckoned religion, and fix your regard on the inward emotions and dispositions.”<sup>51</sup>

It is the second Speech, "The Nature of Religion," that Schleiermacher rightly anticipated would be the most controversial. He here defines religion as "essentially contemplative" and piety as "the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal."<sup>52</sup> Piety is, thus, identified with the active impulse; however, it also has its passive side, appearing "as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man."<sup>53</sup> "True religion is," then, as both active contemplation and surrender, "sense and taste for the Infinite."<sup>54</sup> Its "sum total" consists in feeling that, "in its highest unity, all that moves us in feeling is one; to feel that aught single and particular is only possible by means of this unity; to feel, that is to say, that our being and living is a being and living in and through God."<sup>55</sup>

Moreover, just as religion recognizes that humanity attains its perfect expression by means of endless variety, religion itself is fashioned according to each individual's feeling. Therefore, the fruit of true religion is a modesty and "friendly, attractive forbearance" that "flees with repugnance the bald uniformity which would again destroy this divine abundance."<sup>56</sup> The spirit of sectarianism, or the fear that drives us towards isolation, is the enemy of religion. The key, then, to nurturing religious feeling is to embrace all in love. Schleiermacher was, no doubt, remembering his epiphany at Schlobitten, the defining moment from which he dates all of his religious development. He writes, "All is present in vain for those who have set themselves alone. In order to receive the life of the World-Spirit, and have religion, man must first, in love, and through love, have found humanity."<sup>57</sup> For those who can arrive at no sense of the *One* and the *All* as it applies to this one microcosm of which they are a part, the Infinite will never be anything more than a word.

Like science, religion apprehends system; however, religion neither progresses along empirical lines of thought, nor does it construct a system from an analysis of intuition. Although true religion and true science can never be opposed, religion does not depend upon science in the same way that science depends upon religion. Unless one is possessed with a genuine sense for the Infinite and has cultivated one's intuitive consciousness, one cannot achieve true science. Although Schleiermacher had earlier placed morality and religion on an apparently equal footing, he here acknowledges that morality too is dependent on a sense for the Infinite: "To wish to have true science *or true practice* without religion, or to imagine it is possessed, is obstinate, arrogant delusion, and culpable error."<sup>58</sup> Morality, in order to be genuine, cannot originate in a simple submission to a code of conduct, but must instead derive from one's sense of relation to or position within the Infinite and Eternity.

We may imagine the benevolent spirit of Spinoza overlooking the composition of this discourse and inspiring its author. Accordingly, Schleiermacher appeals to

his readers to participate in the grateful acknowledgment of his muse:

Offer with me reverently a tribute to the manes of the holy, rejected Spinoza. The high World-Spirit pervaded him; the Infinite was his beginning and his end; the Universe was his only and his everlasting love. In holy innocence and in deep humility he beheld himself mirrored in the eternal world, and perceived how he also was its most worthy mirror. He was full of religion, full of the Holy Spirit. Wherefore, he stands there alone and unequalled; master in his art, yet without disciples and without citizenship, sublime above the profane tribe.<sup>59</sup>

What Schleiermacher emphasizes in this passage is Spinoza's piety, a piety which—regardless of whatever extent it may be interconnected with Spinoza's philosophical *method*—is nevertheless not to be conflated with his philosophical *conclusions*. It is in this respect that Spinoza appears to Friedrich Schlegel as the very model of a Christian, one for whom all things mediate between God and man.<sup>60</sup> Spinoza is the Apostle of the *En kai Pan*, and not only for Schlegel, for Schleiermacher himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Spinoza as such. It is the philosopher's sense of the *All* in the *One* and the *One* in the *All*, of the interrelatedness of the finite and the Infinite, that has had a formative influence in Schleiermacher's thinking. It is Spinoza's method, the endeavor of the religious "to open in those who are not yet capable of religious emotions, the sense for the unity of the original source of life"<sup>61</sup>—it is this, and this only, says Schleiermacher, that Spinoza has impressed upon him.

While praising Spinoza, Schleiermacher must have been mindful of those other readers of his, the despisers of *heterodox* religion, including and especially Sack. Schleiermacher reminds this other audience that an attempt to evaluate Spinoza's religion by beginning with his non-anthropomorphic conception of the Deity would be a gross error, for it is not in intellectual conception that we may find religion. As Schleiermacher says, the "rejection of the idea of a personal Deity" in Spinoza's thought "does not decide against the presence of the Deity in his feeling."<sup>62</sup>

When Schleiermacher forwarded these two Speeches to Sack for his approval, he was well aware of the tensions that had already developed between them. Only a few months earlier Schleiermacher had noted, in correspondence, that he and Sack had a "heart-to-heart talk . . . about my Jewish associations," a talk in which Sack had expressed his concern in regard to "the tone" that Schleiermacher had gradually been adopting from his society, a tone that would ultimately result in "indifference and antagonism" toward the ministry.<sup>63</sup> The second discourse of the *Speeches*,

Schleiermacher feared, would not only confirm Sack in his opinion of the negative influence of the Herz circle, but would result in censorship and, possibly, the suspension of his license to preach. He was, therefore, determined not to disclose his identity as the author until—and *unless*—the *Speeches* received Sack's *imprimatur*.

In his capacity as Censor, Sack passed the *Speeches*, but before he had completed reading the fourth discourse he surmised the authorship. The third Speech, "The Cultivation of Religion," besides presenting a condemnation of the "blind idolatry" of contemporary utilitarianism, offers nothing that is not consistent with and implied in the previous two discourses. The fourth Speech, on "Association in Religion, or Church and Priesthood," however, touched upon the themes that would have naturally arisen during discussions between Sack and Schleiermacher. Sack could not fail to hear the voice of his protégé. Even so, since the author of the *Speeches* chose to remain anonymous, Sack did not consider it fitting to approach Schleiermacher in the capacity of ecclesiastical overseer. The fifth discourse, "The Religions," was completed on April 15, and the *Speeches* were in the hands of the public and reviewed in the *Athenaïm* before July.

### Scandal

If the intellectual and social climate of Berlin had been in 1799 what it was in 1789, then the tensions between Sack and Schleiermacher would not have come to a head; but the Romantic Movement was, in 1799, an overflowing river, and those who were riding high upon its intellectual and emotional waves could see a new and better world on the horizon. Schleiermacher stayed nearer to the shore than did Friedrich Schlegel, but he too felt the force of the current moving him onward, and he too "felt himself compelled to be a modern man with all his heart, with all his feelings, and with all his strength."<sup>64</sup>

Schlegel urged his friend to join him in writing a novel expressing his "religious notions of love, marriage, and friendship," but Schleiermacher doubted his ability.<sup>65</sup> Shortly thereafter, Schlegel had his novel published, and *Lucinde*—which dared to recommend passionate love between the sexes as a means toward human fulfillment—immediately gained notoriety as the definitive obscene book. George Pattison observes that there is a praise of sensuousness, anarchy, and idleness in *Lucinde* that "can be read as a deliberate inversion of the masculine qualities of Enlightenment culture." Borrowing from Ludwig Marcuse's study, *Obscene*, Pattison suggests, "It was not just the talk about bedrooms but the talk about untidy bedrooms, not just the talk about sex but the talk about sex without shame, which

most shocked *Lucinde*'s readers."<sup>66</sup> Unfortunately for Schleiermacher, no sooner had he published a short defense of the novel against its critics, than Schlegel and Mrs. Veit fled Berlin and took up refuge in Jena.

All eyes were now focused on the author of the *Speeches*. Sack was anxious. The thought that Schleiermacher would say nothing was out of the question, but would he succeed in extricating himself from this scandal? Too many, we must imagine, said within themselves, "Now we shall see toward what this 'piety' of Spinoza leads."

What was Schleiermacher to do? Like Schlegel, he had fallen in love with an unhappily married woman; moreover, Eleonore Grunow was the wife of a fellow Berlin clergyman. However, they had not only conducted themselves with discretion, but—and what is more important—without any need for deception or dishonesty. Schleiermacher thought of marriage as, primarily, a spiritual rather than a legal bond, and he believed that neither Dorothea nor Eleonore were "married" women in the highest sense of the word. Therefore, as much as he regretted the way in which the relationship of Schlegel and Dorothea Veit was managed, he could not condemn the love that was between them. He responded with his *Confidential Letters on Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde*, in which he establishes that heterosexual love cannot properly be understood if it is conceived merely as a biological drive or social obligation, for it is, above all else, a way of achieving wholeness as a human being. His intent is clearly to shake the prude by his collar and demand of him whether it is possible that God should ever forbid the love that is essential for growth and life.

### Schleiermacher's Defense

In the context of these circumstances and writings, Sack, in the winter of 1800-1801, wrote a rather severe, but nonetheless honest and thoughtful, letter to Schleiermacher. In this letter Sack expresses his misgivings regarding Schleiermacher's "intimate associations with persons of questionable principles and morals" and his incomprehension how Schleiermacher "could be an honest teacher of Christianity; for no art of sophistry and rhetoric will ever be able to convince any reasonable person that Spinozism and Christian religion can coexist." The only thing that Sack is able to say in praise of Spinoza is, "that despite his poverty he declined the professorial chair offered him at Heidelberg."<sup>67</sup> Sack's advice to his protégé is scarcely concealed: he should resign his appointment as chaplain. For six months Sack kept this letter in his possession, doubting whether he should send it. Then, he received from Schleiermacher a volume of his *Sermons*, and convinced that

Christian preaching from a man with the views of Schleiermacher could only be hypocrisy, he forwarded the letter.

Schleiermacher was glad to have, finally, this valuable “instance of frankness,” but regretted that it had been so long delayed. Defending Schlegel against Sack’s criticism, he attempted to assure his former mentor that his own character remained untainted:

I shall never be the intimate friend of a person of reprehensible views. But neither shall I ever, out of fear of human opinion, deny the comfort of friendship to a person outlawed yet innocent. . . . Furthermore, the goal I have set before myself is this: in time, by means of an irreproachable, consistent life, to bring it to pass that an undeserved bad reputation of my friends cannot cast an injurious light upon me, but rather that my friendship for them can cast a favorable light upon their reputation.<sup>68</sup>

It is, perhaps, worthwhile to note that at about the same time that Sack was composing his letter, Schleiermacher wrote, in concluding his *Soliloquies*, “Let no limit be set upon your love, no measure whether of kind or of duration! . . . Be ashamed to depend on other’s opinions in such matters of holiest import.”<sup>69</sup> Never was there a man with more certainty of self-knowledge than Schleiermacher; he had no dependence upon or fear of others’ evaluations. He was a free man, made free through love, and enabled to love through his sense of the inter-relation between the finite and the Infinite.

Although in no sense could it be said that his friendship with Schlegel was ever replaced—and certainly never repudiated—Schleiermacher would soon begin a more rewarding friendship with Ehrenfried von Willich, who had been drawn to Schleiermacher through the *Soliloquies*. The principle cause for this transition was simply that Schlegel no longer offered that which Schleiermacher needed in his pursuit of perfection.<sup>70</sup> He required no further introduction to the ideals and philosophy of Romanticism, and he would, from this time onward, require no exterior source to provoke him to action. He would, henceforth, in his friendships, often be looked upon and loved as an elder brother or father figure.

Having responded to Sack’s first complaint, Schleiermacher now considers the charge of “Spinozism.” Understanding that it is Spinoza’s non-anthropomorphism, his impersonal conception of Deity, that Christians often find incompatible with their religion, Schleiermacher proceeds by limiting the charge to this particular connection before offering his defense:

Have I indeed spoken with contempt of religion, in the sense in which you take the word, or of belief in a personal God? Never, certainly. I have only said that religion does not depend upon whether or not in abstract thought a person attributes to the infinite, supersensual Cause of the world the predicate of personality. *In this connection*, though I am as little a Spinozist as anyone, I introduced Spinoza as an example . . . .<sup>71</sup>

Schleiermacher, in his great work of dogmatics, *The Christian Faith*, would make his position on this point clear. Because the language of religion is, essentially, the language of poetry, "Christian preachers must have the freedom granted to the poets, to make use of terms which cannot find a place in the terminology of technical theology."<sup>72</sup> Prayer, too, may of course adopt metaphors and make use of anthropomorphic expressions when referring to Deity. After all, such expressions may best convey the religious feeling of relationship and dependence. However, such anthropomorphisms, if mistaken as the language of science, will inevitably result in mythology. Although Schleiermacher is far from opposed to addressing God, within a context of devotion or when among Christians, as "Our Father," this expression would be out of place and, possibly, even a stumbling-block in an apologetic work such as the *Speeches*. As he would later note, in concluding *The Christian Faith*, "Many not merely profess to be but actually think they are opposed to every belief in God, when in fact they are simply repelled by ordinary presentations of the subject, but have by no means parted with all those spiritual affections which spring from God-consciousness."<sup>73</sup>

Schleiermacher has had no more worthy critic than Karl Barth, and no one else has articulated so clearly the nature of the task that Schleiermacher assumed in the *Speeches*: "In so far as the apologist approaches the educated among the despisers of religion from the standpoint of theology he must not desire to speak only from faith and with only the faith of his hearers in view. He must present himself to them in a part which is provided for in their categories, which really occurs or can occur there."<sup>74</sup> When the Lucan St. Paul, in the Areopagus at Athens, argued against pagan fetishism, he appealed not to the testimony of the Hebrew Scriptures, but to the authority of the Greek poets. If wisdom uttered by Epimenides and Cleanthes can be put to holy use in teaching true religion to Epicureans and Stoics, might not, when addressing the Romantics, the wisdom of Spinoza and Kant be sanctified for such a purpose? It would appear that St. Paul too was a modern man, and can we be so certain that, were he alive on the eve of the nineteenth century, he himself would not have written something very similar to the *Speeches*?

### Miraculous Love: Christmas and Easter

In March of 1802 Schleiermacher accepted an appointment as court preacher in Stolpe, within Pomerania. None of his friends could comprehend the motive behind this voluntary exile, but the most likely reason seems to be that he recognized a need to distance himself from Eleonore Grunow—at least, until she could make up her mind to divorce her unloving husband. A year later, she wrote to tell him not to send further letters to her. Still, she held out hope. Meanwhile, the critical scholarship in which Schleiermacher immersed himself while at Stolpe, particularly his translations and introductions to Plato’s dialogues and his evaluation of the ethical systems of philosophers, earned him a faculty position at the University of Halle. Here he began his ground-breaking work in the still unformed discipline of hermeneutics. His position at Halle was secure, and he was pleased to think of the stable home and family life that he and Eleonore could build there. Nevertheless, in October 1805 she broke off the relationship definitely. Schleiermacher was grief-stricken, yet there never was any momentary sadness that could overcome the perpetual joy that filled his heart. A few weeks later, as he returned to his bachelor’s quarters, after spending an evening with friends listening to music, he conceived the plan of a dialogue that would celebrate religious difference in a context of Christian love and joy, *Christmas Eve*.

The Christology of this work anticipates the conclusions Schleiermacher would later work out in more detail in *The Christian Faith* and in his Berlin lectures on the life of Christ. Albert Schweitzer’s complaint against Schleiermacher, that “the great dialectician had not really a historical mind,”<sup>75</sup> has some basis even here; but, the reader who moves from Schleiermacher to Schweitzer must doubt whether the latter really had a theological mind. All of Christianity, including the Scriptural representation of Jesus, has its foundation both in the historical life of the Redeemer *and* in the religious experience of redemption or the feeling of absolute dependence upon God. Thus, as Schleiermacher has the character Ernst say, in *Christmas Eve*, the Christmas festival does not depend on the historical traces of Jesus’s life—which are, at any rate, unsatisfactory—but rather, “It rests on the necessity of a Redeemer, and hence upon the experience of a heightened existence, which can be derived from no other beginning than him.”<sup>76</sup> Schleiermacher repudiates the idea of a miraculous birth and insists, in *The Christian Faith*, that Jesus “developed in the same way as all others, so that from birth on His powers gradually unfolded,” and though in Jesus alone were they “developed to completeness,” yet they developed “in the order natural to the human race.”<sup>77</sup> The idea of the Incarnation, however, does possess

religious significance in that it “is analogous to the regeneration of the whole race considered as a unity.”<sup>78</sup>

After the publication of *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher felt the need to experience the Easter festival with the Moravian community at Barby. Three years earlier, when reflecting on “that mystic tendency” in himself, that strong reliance on religious feeling and intuition, he concluded, “I have become a Herrnhuter again, only of a higher order.”<sup>79</sup> Now, he had the opportunity to unite with the Herrnhuters, once more, in the spirit of Christian piety. “Delightful, sanctified days they were to me,” he wrote, “full of wonderful memories and many enjoyments,” and yet, in respect for their rule, he did not seek to partake of the Lord’s Supper with them.<sup>80</sup> How significant an omission this was! The Lord’s Supper, or communal feast, was to Schleiermacher of crucial importance to Christian fellowship and, thus, to the idea of the Church. In this sacrament “the redeeming and fellowship-forming love of Christ is not only represented but made newly active” on each occasion of its observance. As a simultaneous receptivity to God and outflowing of fellowship, “the consciousness of benefit is accompanied by a sympathetic sense that the same thing is happening to others; and as each knows that the others are being united more closely with Christ, he feels himself more closely united with them.”<sup>81</sup> Only a Herrnhuter of a higher order could feel the significance of the Lord’s Supper in such a way, and yet, with awful irony, Herrnhuter rules forbade Schleiermacher the Lord’s Supper.

### **Return to Berlin**

By November Schleiermacher’s position at Halle was no longer stable. Napoleon’s troops invaded the city at the beginning of November, 1806, and Schleiermacher suffered much worse than having his rooms looted. The university was to remain closed until it could be reopened under the Napoleonic government of Westphalia. Schleiermacher, with patriotic resolve, decided to look for a position elsewhere, “for to operations which are directed straightways towards the destruction of German sentiment and German spirit, I cannot give even the support which my presence would imply.”<sup>82</sup> In the summer of 1807 he returned to Berlin, where he would live for the remainder of his life.

A few months before leaving Halle, Schleiermacher received word from Willich’s wife that his friend was dead. While serving as a chaplain in a Prussian regiment, he had taken a fever and in a few days had perished. Henriette, his young wife, sent off a letter: “Oh, my Schleier! . . . I implore you, by all that you love and hold sacred, if you can, give me the certainty that I shall find him again—that I shall

recognize him! Tell me your innermost belief in regard to this, dear Schleier. Alas! it will be annihilation to me to lose this faith.”<sup>83</sup> Schleiermacher, although clearly incapable of saying anything contrary to his innermost belief, yet reveals his evident concern for Henriette:

There is the greatest certainty—and nothing would be certain if it were not so—that for the soul there is no such thing as death, no annihilation. But personal life is not the essence of spiritual being; it is but an outward presentiment thereof. . . . But if your imagination suggests to you a merging in the great all, let not this, dear child, fill you with bitter, poignant anguish. Do not conceive of it as a lifeless, but as a living commingling—as the highest life. . . . If then he lives in God, and you love him eternally in God, as you knew God and loved God in him, can you conceive of anything more glorious or delightful?<sup>84</sup>

If Henriette was not altogether satisfied, neither was she disconsolate. She continued to rely upon the guidance and love of “dear father.” Their relationship deepened, and finally, in the spring of 1808, Schleiermacher took a brief vacation from his work in Berlin, and when he returned he was engaged to be married.

Besides his private lectures on history and philosophy and the continued work on Plato, Schleiermacher was now active, along with Wilhelm von Humboldt and Johann Fichte, in the labor of creating a new university. This university would lead the civilized world in education and fully represent the ideals of the reformed Prussia that, with optimistic anticipation and patriotic fervor, Schleiermacher believed would emerge out of the fiery ordeal with the enemy. This was to be the University of Berlin, and in 1810 Schleiermacher—now married to Henriette—became its first Professor of Theology. In this same year he began his critical study of Luke, the results of which would be published in 1817.<sup>85</sup> Here, as Wilhelm Dilthey points out, “Surrounded by indifference, he began, before anyone else, to assert the great historical task of the Church which many years of preaching, serving the Church and theology had impressed upon him: he became the spiritual head of the Church of his time.”<sup>86</sup> He perceived that the future of Protestantism was closely bound up with the fate of Germany and German culture. Although he possessed a philosophic tranquility that was impervious to fate, yet he fought as a German Christian, with weapons of the spirit, for the cultural well-being of his fatherland.

## The Christian Faith

Of all his ecclesiastical projects, the one that was closest to his heart was the unification of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. It was with this prospect in mind that he set about to write what Tübingen theologian Hans Küng calls “the most significant Dogmatics of modern times, . . . which for its ingenious uniqueness and otherness can certainly be set alongside the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas and Calvin’s *Institutes*.”<sup>87</sup> In *The Christian Faith*, Schleiermacher demonstrates that the foundation of Christian dogmatics resides not in intellectual conception, but in religious feeling—specifically, in the feeling of absolute dependence upon God, which in the Christian religion is expressed fundamentally in the experience of redemption through the mediation of Christ. The truth of Christian dogma is never more than approximate, measured as it were by the Christian experience itself, and Christian faith “is nothing other than the incipient experience of the satisfaction of that spiritual need [of redemption] by Christ.”<sup>88</sup> This being the case, as long as any difference in the articulation of that experience does not undermine the centrality of the Redeemer, there can be no basis for division.<sup>89</sup>

The Introduction to *The Christian Faith* is philosophical and apologetic, and as such it complements and clarifies the *Speeches*. Whereas in his earlier work Schleiermacher was content to leave “feeling” undefined, he now distinguishes between the feeling of freedom and the feeling of dependence, and concludes that “the total self-consciousness made up of both together is one of *Reciprocity*” so that “without any feeling of freedom a feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible.” Thus, it is possible to feel free within the sphere of spontaneous movement while also being conscious of one’s relation to God, and it is this self-consciousness—or consciousness of one’s self in relation to God—that is identical with the feeling of absolute dependence.<sup>90</sup> This is the feeling that possesses the finite as it intuitively grasps its contingency in its relation to the Infinite, and yet in so far as the feeling is the result of this relationship, it also confirms the presence of the Infinite within the finite, so that it may be said that “the feeling of absolute dependence [is] in itself a co-existence of God in the self-consciousness.”<sup>91</sup>

Georg F. W. Hegel, who in 1818 succeeded Fichte to the post of Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin, is the author of what Küng rightly calls, “one of the most malicious *bon mots* about Schleiermacher’s thought.”<sup>92</sup> Hegel flippantly remarked that, if religion is the feeling of “absolute dependence,” then a dog is surely the best Christian. Although this response is hardly deserving of consideration in light of what has already been said in the foregoing paragraph, it needs to be noted that Schleiermacher did anticipate “a non-religious explanation of this sense of

absolute dependence.” In light of his known pantheism, some of his critics would presumably argue that what is implied and made the center of reference for Schleiermacher is not God but Nature or “the world.”

Spinoza, we may recall, identified two attributes of the one substance; those attributes are thought and extension. When substance is conceived in terms of thought, it is denominated as God; when it is conceived in terms of extension, it is denominated as Nature. Schleiermacher now clearly states in *The Christian Faith* that the sense of absolute dependence upon God cannot be confused with the sense of dependence on the world and that the one feeling is distinguishable from the other: “To be one with the world in self-consciousness is nothing else than being conscious that we are a living part of this whole; and this cannot possibly be a consciousness of absolute dependence; the more so that all living parts stand in reciprocal interaction with each other.”<sup>93</sup> That there may exist a feeling of dependence between finite particulars Schleiermacher does not deny, but this feeling co-exists with the reciprocal feeling of freedom in so far as each finite particular may experience spontaneous action or movement. Thus, the feeling of dependence that human beings may feel in their relation to the world is never absolute. By insisting on this difference between the sense of dependence upon God and a feeling of dependence upon the world, Schleiermacher is clearly attempting to throw off the millstone of the heavily weighted charge of “pantheism.” God and Nature are not synonymous terms.

Of course, by negating the simple equation of God and Nature, Schleiermacher is in no way contradicting Spinoza, for whom the two attributes are synonymous only in the sense that each independently allows for a comprehension of the one Substance. To say that the feeling of absolute dependence is our consciousness of relation to God rather than to Nature is merely to say that it is a consciousness that is possible solely within the attribute of thought, by pure reason, such as can only be interrupted and vitiated by physical sensation. It is, then, an experience profoundly other than corporeal and terrestrial. This is “the highest stage of religion,” in which “God and the world will remain distinct at least as regards function.”<sup>94</sup> Schleiermacher’s careful distinction merely leaves him susceptible to the charge of mysticism; it cannot vindicate him from the charge of Spinozism, and certainly Schleiermacher has his admirers for whom it is this very fact that makes his Christian theology most appealing.

In regard to this “feeling of absolute dependence,” a more thoughtful critic than Hegel is Henry L. Mansel (1820-1871). Mansel, in Oxford’s Bampton Lectures of 1858, observes that the essential difference between the feelings of relationship to the world and to God is a difference “in degree rather than in kind”—that is, it a *quantitative* rather than a *qualitative* difference. God, in Schleiermacher’s theology,

“is merely the world magnified to infinity: and the feeling of absolute dependence is in fact that of annihilation of our personal existence in the Infinite Being of the Universe.”<sup>95</sup> This criticism anticipated the more well-known objections made by Rudolf Otto (1869-1937). In *The Idea of the Holy* (1917), Otto appears to be in fundamental agreement with Mansel, arguing that Schleiermacher’s error was in distinguishing “absolute” from “relative” dependence, thereby making the difference one of degree rather than of quality. When Schleiermacher gave the essentially religious feeling a name, the “feeling of absolute dependence,” he was merely employing an analogy, one that, however useful it may be in clarifying a difference in *degrees* of feeling, is quite useless and, in fact, an impediment when trying to establish the *quality* of the religious experience. Otto renames this feeling “creature-consciousness” or “creature-feeling,” noting, however, that the most that this new term can express is “the note of submergence into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of some kind.”<sup>96</sup> Whereas Schleiermacher had argued that the feeling originates in the self-conscious awareness of one’s relation to the Infinite, and itself implies the presence of the Infinite, Otto conceived that the feeling of the presence of God actually precedes and is the cause of “creature-feeling.” This prior feeling Otto denominated the sense of the *numinous* or “the holy” minus its moral factor and its rational aspect.<sup>97</sup>

Regardless of what we may conclude regarding Mansel’s and Otto’s criticisms—which, it might be added, were rejected by Richard Niebuhr on the ground that “the feeling of absolute dependence is not,” for Schleiermacher, “the name for a faculty or category of the mind”<sup>98</sup>—the fact remains that Otto’s contribution to Protestant theology is inconceivable without the previous achievement of Schleiermacher. As Oxford theologian W. B. Selbie observed, Schleiermacher “brought out for the first time the true place of experience in religion.” In this respect, he “may be said to have started a new epoch, and the results of it are with us to this day.”<sup>99</sup> To the extent that twentieth-century theology has been influenced by Otto—and we may list Marburg colleagues Paul Tillich and Rudolph Bultmann among those who have been guided by Otto’s light—it has also been influenced by Schleiermacher. In fact, Barth, Tillich, Niebuhr, Küng, and many others have given tribute to Schleiermacher as the “father” of modern Protestantism.

### **Strauss and Final Communion**

In October 1831 the Professor received into his home a student, David Friedrich Strauss (1808-1874), who was on a brief visit to the University of Berlin. Schleiermacher had been, for the past twelve years, developing and revising his university

lectures on the life of Jesus, and one of the reasons that had brought Strauss to Berlin was to hear these lectures. He had also been attracted to Berlin by the brilliance of Hegel, who was becoming to Strauss's generation what Kant had been to Schleiermacher's. Already something of a rivalry between Hegel and Schleiermacher was developing. F. D. Maurice would later observe that numbers flee to Hegel "just because the Consciousness of Schleiermacher is felt to be unsatisfactory, because it is thought to make Truth dependent upon our feelings instead of being fixed and eternal; that Schleiermacher is fled to by numbers because Hegel's absolute teaching appears to be so hard and inhuman."<sup>100</sup> On November 14, Schleiermacher brought sad news to his guest: Hegel had been carried off by cholera. Strauss's unthoughtful response has often been noted: "And it was to hear *him* that I came to Berlin."<sup>101</sup>

Although Strauss returned to Tübingen University in 1832 to take up the position of Assistant Lecturer in Theology—at which post he gained some notoriety as an apostle of Hegel—he apparently made a return to Berlin at some time in 1833. An Oxford Fellow and the future Bishop of St. Andrews, Charles Wordsworth (a nephew of the poet) visited the University of Berlin and attended lectures by both Schleiermacher and Strauss between the late autumn of 1833 and early spring of 1834. Wordsworth's description of the aged theologian may be of interest:

SCHLEIERMACHER, a little old man, weak and tottering, with flowing white hair and with spectacles through which his eye pierced with undimmed lustre, took his seat behind a raised desk. . . . His manner was interesting and energetic rather than solemn or impressive; and occasionally he was facetious, so as to elicit roars of laughter from his audience.<sup>102</sup>

When Strauss made his first visit to Berlin, he was preparing to write a history of the ideas of primitive Christianity, but after obtaining a copy of Schleiermacher's lecture notes, that plan changed. Wordsworth significantly notes that Strauss "had come to Berlin to attend Schleiermacher's lectures."<sup>103</sup> In 1835, Strauss published his *Life of Jesus Critically Examined*, the book that, as Schweitzer observes, "rendered him famous in a moment—and utterly destroyed his prospects."<sup>104</sup> It also destroyed the prospects for Schleiermacher's *Life of Jesus*, which was published posthumously in 1864 from his lecture notes. This is not to suggest that Strauss's work is unoriginal, but merely that it took what was of value in Schleiermacher's and then made it practically obsolete by advancing much further in his critical approach. Strauss himself was anxious to distinguish his own work from Schleiermacher's, and so in 1865 he published his polemic against the critical method upon which the lectures had been based.

Schleiermacher did not live to see the publication of Strauss's *Life*. On the morning of the 12 February 1834, after several days of illness and being in great discomfort, he addressed his family. In a truly touching narrative—sometimes supposed, and not without reason, to have the stretch-marks peculiar to popular hagiography—Schleiermacher's widow recounts his words in the final moments of his life:

“I have never clung to the dead letter, and we have the atoning death of Jesus Christ, his body and his blood. I have ever believed, and still believe, that the Lord Jesus gave the communion in water and in wine.”

While saying this he raised himself up, his countenance lighted up, his voice became clear and strong. He then asked with priestly solemnity: “Do you agree with me in this belief, that the Lord Jesus consecrated the water also that was in the wine?” to which we replied with a loud yes! “Then let us take the Communion: the wine for you, the water for me,” he added solemnly; “but there is no time to fetch G—, quick! quick! Let no one take offence at the form.” The necessary things having been brought in while we waited in solemn silence, an expression of heavenly rapture spread over his features, a strange lustre shone in his eyes, a look of beaming love fell upon us all, and after a few devout words of prayer, he commenced the holy ceremony. . . . After he had pronounced the blessing, his eyes turned once more to me with a look full of love, and he said, “In this love and communion we are, and ever will remain united.” He sank back upon his pillow. . . . He breathed heavily several times, and life was gone.<sup>105</sup>

A day or two later, as the city of Berlin paid its final respects, Wordsworth “took part in the procession of students and others, on foot and in carriages, who formed an almost interminable *cortège* at his funeral.”<sup>106</sup> The union of the individual person with all of humanity and the union of the finite in the Infinite, experienced in feeling and intuition and celebrated in communion, was now fully realized in death. Like a single drop of water fallen to earth, evaporated, and reabsorbed, so the finite individual had now been reabsorbed into the Infinite from whence he had come and of which he had never truly ceased to be a part.

Years earlier, Schleiermacher had written to Eleonore Grunow, “I might almost say, that if Christ had done nothing more than institute the holy communion, I should have loved Him to adoration.”<sup>107</sup> If there could be only one word to describe the thought of Schleiermacher, might not that apt word be *communion*? His is truly a communion faith, rooted in a theology that disallows walls of division and perceives

only unity while celebrating difference, a *realist* theology that recognizes as a *fait accompli* the eternal communion of the All in the One, a *subjective* theology that calls upon faith to make this communion realized in our finite minds, and a *practical* theology that, for the sake of peace and justice, demands a visible sign of God's unity with humanity in our temporal context, the here and the now. As such, Schleiermacher's theology contributed its impetus in the development and mature expression of a liberal Anglican theology.

### Schleiermacher in England

Schleiermacher never entertained a lofty opinion of England. In his younger years, it was to him nothing more or less than the island of utilitarian Philistinism.<sup>108</sup> This was, of course, a generalization, yet it was not, perhaps, undeserved. English insularity had been fostered by the geographical aspect of the nation. John Donne had proclaimed, "No man is an island," yet solidarity of English sentiment declared that the island was *not* part of the main. A spirit of John Bull self-reliance and general suspiciousness of continental ideas resulted, by the end of the eighteenth century, in a provincialism of the worst sort. Not only had England forfeited any claim to leadership in the world of ideas—aside from the contribution made to utilitarian theory—but through pride in industrial growth and economic expansion, the English had adopted a narrowness of vision that tended to be blind to cultural deficiencies. Even so, England had not closed its universities.

At Cambridge, in 1811, Herbert Marsh (1757-1839), Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity, afterward Bishop of Peterborough, delivered a series of lectures on contemporary criticism of the Gospels. Marsh, who had studied in Germany under Göttingen professor Johann David Michaelis (1717-91), returned to England to translate and publish Michaelis's four-volume *Introduction to the New Testament* (1793-1801). Marsh's lectures, based on his book *The History of Sacred Criticism* (1809), sought to popularize current German methods of critical analysis and were generally popular at the university—though not by Evangelicals, with whom Marsh had something like a standing feud.

Even so, the alarm against German theological rationalism was first sounded not at Cambridge, but at Oxford, by its Professor of Anglo-Saxon and Poetry, John Josias Conybeare. In the Bampton Lectures of 1824, *An Attempt to Trace the History and to Ascertain the Limits of the Secondary and Spiritual Interpretation of Scripture*, Conybeare warned, "Of later years a school has arisen, happily not in our own Church or country, but yet a school which possibly may not be without its

share of influence upon our theological students, openly and professedly discarding as irrational and uncritical all spiritual and allegorical interpretations whatsoever.”<sup>109</sup> For Conybeare, the rationalists are “those who contend for the literal, and the literal sense alone.” Their ideological precursors are the Scribes and Pharisees, who despised allegorical or spiritual interpretation, and their method involves either doubting the inspiration of the biblical authors who employ this manner of interpretation or asserting that all application of prophecy is “accommodated to the description and illustration of subjects foreign to their original scope and intention.” Conybeare urged his listeners to “pray that we may ourselves be preserved from the contagion” and that God “may yet raise and send forth into his vineyard labourers more earnestly devoted and more spiritually qualified for its cultivation and protection.”<sup>110</sup>

In May of 1825 Hugh James Rose (1795-1838), the Select Preacher of Cambridge, delivered before the university four discourses on *The State of Protestantism in Germany, Described*. Rose, the author of *The Folly and Danger of Reading Irreligious Publications* (1821)—who, only eight years before his lectures, had begun to study German under the tutelage of J. C. Hare—had been traveling on the Continent during the past year and was, at the time of first presenting his discourses, unaware of Conybeare’s lectures. But, as Rose himself afterwards noted, his predecessor had not gone into such detail on the subject of German rationalism as to preclude further treatment. Rose effectively resounded Conybeare’s alarm, in pitch and volume so as to be distinctly heard. The subject of Rose’s discourses is “the theology of the Protestant Churches of Germany” from 1750 to the present. During this period, says Rose, “A very large majority of the divines of these Church rejected, in a word, all belief in the Divine origin of Christianity, and anxiously endeavoured to instil into others the opinions which they had embraced themselves.”<sup>111</sup> The error of Evangelical and Reformed Churches, and even more of Germany’s unified church, is that a subscription to Articles of Faith is not enforced, and so the ecclesiastical overseers have no power “of removing the ministers who renounce that adherence.”<sup>112</sup> Truly, Rose seems to envision German clerics as a band of incorrigible schoolboys, who—lacking the discipline of a heavy-handed Headmaster—have associated into pacts bent on destruction.

The Select Preacher can find no words to fully express the “contempt,” “horror,” and “disgust” that he has felt during his reading of rationalist German literature. Although he justly recognizes the practical impossibility of proving his point, he has no doubt that the seeds of rationalism have born fruit in mysticism, indifference, hypocrisy, infidelity, and immorality. Therefore, he warns, “If man must err, if he will not be content with the religion of Christ as Christ taught it, far,

far better for him is it to believe too much than too little. He may assent, perhaps, to error—but the principle of his belief is still pure and unsullied.”<sup>113</sup> Rose recognizes that there may be some passages in Scripture involving difficulty in interpretation, but in these cases, he advises, the only safe course is to rely upon the understanding of “those Christian writers who lived at the outset of the Christian system.”<sup>114</sup> With such principles as these, Rose—as will shall see in Chapter 6—was well-suited to take the leading role in the Hadleigh Conference of 1833.

Connop Thirlwall (1797-1875) had been an associate of Rose’s in undergraduate days at Trinity College. He too had studied German under Hare’s guidance. Moreover, this future Bishop of St. David’s had attended Marsh’s lectures and recognized that the Germans were far advanced in the discipline of biblical criticism. He became deeply interested in Schleiermacher just after the publication of *The Christian Faith* in 1821. As he was particularly impressed with the technical expertise underlying Schleiermacher’s redactionist reading in the *Critical Essay on St. Luke’s Gospel*, he thought he could be of service to the Church of England by translating and publishing this essay, along with a critical Introduction. In 1825, just two months before Rose’s lectures, Thirlwall’s translation went into print, but only a few copies were sold, and there was to be no second printing. As Henry Crabb Robinson wrote, the work fell “dead born from the press.”<sup>115</sup> An anonymous fifty-six page review in *The British Critic* declared that Schleiermacher’s principles were “wholly inadmissible,” and the reading public took the reviewer at his word.<sup>116</sup> The English Church would not tolerate the influence of this textbook of “neology,” and even though the character and aims of Schleiermacher were yet unknown to the English, his name now became practically synonymous with German heresy. Thirlwall had labored under the best of intentions, but his efforts, due to no fault of his own, had the most undesirable effect. Even F. D. Maurice, who recognized Schleiermacher as “the most thorough, devout, accomplished defender of Consciousness as the instrument, to some extent the measure, of belief whom the world has seen or is likely to see,” thought that Thirlwall’s English translation of the *Critical Essay* a grave misfortune, as—of all the German theologian’s works—this was “the most likely to offend religious people in England, and so mislead them as to his real character and objects.”<sup>117</sup>

Despite the conservative reaction, Cambridge was not to be the only English university that had within its halls a friend of Schleiermacher. During the summers of 1825 and 1826 one of the leading theological scholars of Oxford, Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-82), was in Germany visiting the major university cities. In Göttingen he attended the lectures of famed biblical scholar Johann Gottfried Eichhorn (1752-1827) and befriended Christian C. F. Bunsen (1791-1860), then a

Professor of Philosophy and Librarian. While in Berlin, he became fast friends with Tholuck, whose influence would soon be felt at the University of Halle, and made the acquaintance of Strauss and Schleiermacher. Pusey had the advantage of attending Schleiermacher's lectures on Acts, Galatians, and Thessalonians, as well as on the principles of practical theology. For Schleiermacher, theology served the interests of religion, and religion was based on feeling; philosophy, on the other hand, had to do with intellectual conception and abstract reasoning. When theology and philosophy were merged, there developed the monstrosity of scholasticism. Pusey, according to his biographer, was veritably impressed with Schleiermacher's insistence on keeping the two disciplines separate.<sup>118</sup>

When Pusey returned from Germany, he responded to Rose with the first part of his *Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately Predominate in the Theology of Germany* (1828). Prefaced to this substantial work is a letter by C. H. Sack, Professor of Theology at Bonn, which—while partly despairing in the improbability of correcting the misguided English imagination—seeks to correct Rose in four points. *First*, although the liberty given to university teachers and authors was sometimes abused, the Protestant Churches of Germany never permitted its ministers to depart from the authority of Confessions of Faith. *Second*, the disorders observed in Germany cannot be attributed to the want of some external restraint upon the mind, as in subscription to Articles of Faith. *Third*, the aberrations in doctrine appear “partly to have taken place beyond the limits of the Church, partly to have been a necessary point of transition to a purer theology, partly to have been less widely extended than the author represents.” *Fourth*, the counter-measures, by which the progress of Rationalism was opposed and checked, is by the author overlooked.<sup>119</sup> Although Sack's manner is too gentlemanly to make a blunt accusation, his corrections nevertheless imply that—from his perspective, at least—Rose's *State of Protestantism in Germany* is unbalanced, unjust, inflammatory, and calculated to arouse the prejudices of ignorant and fearful minds.

Rose's method of detailing the characteristics of theological rationalism, without attempting either to delineate the historical sequence of ideas or to consistently discriminate between individual thinkers, tended to create the illusion of a single disease called Rationalism, with which almost all German theologians were, to some extent, infected. Although the peculiar strand of Rationalism that had infected Schleiermacher could be traced to Kant, there appeared, by Rose's account, no moral difference in the symptoms. Pusey attempted, in “justice to that great man,” to rectify this oversight: “Whatever be the errors of his system,” he wrote, Schleiermacher “has done more than (some very few perhaps excepted) any other, to the restoration of religious belief in Germany.”<sup>120</sup> Pusey might have simply noted

that even the two quotations that Schleiermacher chose for the title-page of *The Christian Faith* reveal the author's prioritizing of experience over reason. Ironically, they are both from the *Proslogion* of the *English* archbishop St. Anselm: "Nor do I seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand"; "For he who does not believe, does not experience, and he who does not experience, does not understand." Clearly, Schleiermacher is not to be lumped together, as Rose had done, with rationalists like Semler and Paulus or Fichte and Schelling.

Pusey's *Historical Enquiry* corroborated Sack and further controverted Rose. According to Pusey, the rise of Protestant nation-states did nothing to convert the essentially scholastic and polemical mind of the learned of Germany, and—partly as the result of the ensuing controversies, partly as the effort to eliminate the need for them—Protestant doctrine was crystalized into increasingly rigid and comprehensive formulae. This process began with the Confession of Augsburg's twenty-one positive articles of 1530 and continued, in 1536, with the Concord of Wittenberg, which reached a tentative agreement with the Zwinglians on the doctrine of the Eucharist. Continued strife between the Lutheran and Reformed leaders ultimately resulted, in 1574, in the Articles of Torgau or "formula of concord." "Until this was adopted," says Pusey, "a certain latitude was still allowed by the symbolical books, though not indeed equal to that permitted by our own articles." After its reception, however, "exact uniformity of expression, or of minute mode of conception, was made the condition of belonging to the Lutheran communion," and the division between Evangelical and Reformed Churches was sealed for two and a half centuries.<sup>121</sup> Subsequently, the enforced adherence to a strict formula of faith within the Lutheran Church resulted in an increase of party spirit, and—as "Scriptural interpretation, instead of being the mistress and guide, became the handmaid of doctrinal Theology"—the spirit of free enquiry, in biblical and other sciences, once again lost their value and seemed to imply heretical inclinations.<sup>122</sup> Biblical preaching and practical Christianity became exceedingly rare, and by the time of the beginnings of the Pietist movement and the founding of the University of Halle, both under the influence of Spener in the latter half of the seventeenth century, the German mind had been prepared for the onslaught of a rationalism imported in the form of Deism.<sup>123</sup>

Thus, Pusey turned the tables on Rose, demonstrating not only that a strict enforcement of a formula of faith, far from being the *cure*, was rather a precipitating *cause* of rationalism, but also that, if England now had anything to fear from the invasion of German ideas, it was only because Germany first had suffered through the contagion of English Deism. Julius Charles Hare (1795-1855), Archdeacon of

Lewes, fully entered into the spirit of Pusey's argument and proclaimed the Teutonic brotherhood of England and Germany: "The Saxons came in of yore as our helpers, and became our masters; but now they are our brethren. Their battle is ours; ours in theirs." History and culture both attest to this intercourse between minds essentially identical:

Even the blessings which came to us from the German Reformation, were only a return for those which we had sent to Germany centuries before in the mission of Boniface. The influence exercised by Shakspeare, at least over literature, has been far greater in Germany than in England. . . . All these things point to the original brotherhood between the English mind and the German.<sup>124</sup>

Such sentiments as these were not popular in early Victorian England, and both Hare and the young, pre-Tractarian Pusey, were targets of Low and High Church resentment. But, as far as *that* goes, neither cared—no, not a whit—whether he came out smelling like a Rose.

At it turned out, Pusey's efforts on behalf of Schleiermacher—although later a source of embarrassment to him—could not have been better timed. In September of 1828 Schleiermacher spent three weeks in London, his first and last visit to England. The occasion of this brief visit was family business,<sup>125</sup> but he managed somehow to receive a steady stream of callers and, for three successive Sundays, to preach on invitation for a Lutheran congregation in the Savoy. He had little time for sight-seeing, and although he did make it to St. Paul's, he felt himself rewarded for his effort "neither in point of devotion nor of artistic taste."<sup>126</sup> There was one visit, however, that was rewarding. Upon arriving in London, Schleiermacher let it be known that he wanted to be introduced to his English translator. When Thirlwall was informed, he wasted no time in coming to London and bringing his esteemed guest back with him to Cambridge. There, Thirlwall had the pleasure of bringing the theologian to the home of his friend and fellow historian, George Grote. In consideration of Schleiermacher's strong sentiments against utilitarianism, it is amusing to imagine him being entertained at Cambridge by a Benthamite banker. Yet, in the event, no other arrangement could have proved better, for the cultured German enthusiastically supposed that he had met in the person of Grote a genuine phenomenon—a banker who reads Greek authors.<sup>127</sup>

Schleiermacher's reception in England was not, however, entirely cordial. The work of Strauss, along with that of Semler and Paulus—or rather, I should say, the *reputation* of their work—went far to prejudice the English mind against German

theological influence. Subsequently, the influence of Schleiermacher was appreciably hindered during the period of the first generation of Broad Churchmen. In fact, what first brought public attention to these men *as a group* was their “Germanisms,” or what was presumed to be the influence of modern German theology upon their thought. The December 1848 issue of *The English Review* presented an anonymous article entitled “On Tendencies toward the Subversion of Faith.” This article was a review of recent books, and the author, the Tractarian theologian William Palmer of Worcester College, Oxford, implied that a pernicious school of thought had formed in England and that the individual members of it were somehow implicated in each other’s conclusions. Grouped together were John Sterling, J. C. Hare, Baron Bunsen, Thomas Carlyle, S. T. Coleridge, R. W. Emerson, Connop Thirlwall, F. D. Maurice, Francis Newman, J. S. Mill, Samuel Wilberforce, Thomas Arnold, R. C. Trench, and Blanco White.<sup>128</sup> The connections between some of these men were superficial at best, and certainly not all could in any sense be thought of as Broad Churchmen. Even so, the idea of an identifiable group had suddenly been foisted upon the popular imagination, and beneath this idea there was some foundation of truth.

Palmer had singled out J. C. Hare, as—if not the ringleader—the most zealous instigator among the whole bunch. Hare, in his response, observes that the grounds for Palmer’s accusations against him “may be ranged under two heads; first, the publication of the prose writings of my dear friend, Sterling, with the sketch of his life prefixed to them; and secondly, the part I am said to have taken in encouraging the study of German Theology, with the purpose . . . of undermining the faith of the English Church.”<sup>129</sup> Hare first began to learn the German language at the age of nine, while living with his parents at Weimar. By the time that Hare was appointed Archdeacon of Lewes, in 1840, there was, perhaps, no one in England, including Carlyle (the translator of Goethe), and Mary Anne Evans (the translator of Strauss and Feuerbach), who was better qualified than Hare to discuss German theological thought.<sup>130</sup> The Hare-family biographer offers this anecdote, which is altogether *à propos* of our present study: When Lady Jones, Hare’s aunt who had raised him after the death of his mother, expressed her ardent wish that all his German books were burnt, the twenty-four-year-old scholar replied with admirable indignation:

As for my German books, I hope from my heart that the day will never arrive when I shall be induced to burn them, for I am convinced that I never shall do so, unless I have first become a base slave of Mammon, and a mere vile lump of selfishness. I shall never be able to repay a hundredth part of the obligation I am under to them, even though I were to shed every

drop of my blood in defence of their liberties. For to them I owe the best of all my knowledge, and if they have not purified my heart, the fault is my own. Above all, to them I owe my ability to believe in Christianity with a much more implicit and intelligent faith than I otherwise should have been able to have done; for without them I should only have saved myself from dreary suspicion, by a refusal to allow my heart to follow my head, and by a self-willed determination to believe whether my reason approved of my belief or not.<sup>131</sup>

In 1822 Hare introduced Thirlwall to Schleiermacher's *Critical Essay on the Gospel of St. Luke*<sup>132</sup>, and from 1828 to 1832 he collaborated with Thirlwall in translating from the German Niebuhr's *History of Rome*. In his subsequent *Vindication* of Niebuhr he described Schleiermacher as "the great ornament and glory of the reformed church in Germany."<sup>133</sup> He also introduced his curate, John Sterling, to Schleiermacher in 1834. After leaving Herstmonceaux, Sterling developed so profound an admiration for this theologian, finding in his Sermons "such an extent of knowledge, such a conscientious sobriety of judgment, and a moral structure so thoroughly earnest, disciplined, and all alive, as I have never seen rivaled in any other."<sup>134</sup> Sterling made repeated efforts to interest Carlyle in Schleiermacher, perhaps suspecting that through this means Carlyle might come to a deeper appreciation of Coleridge, but Carlyle had an "obstinate indifference" for any thinker of the Kantian School.<sup>135</sup> Ultimately, however, the influence of Schleiermacher upon Sterling proved to be only a stepping-stone to the more radical neology of Strauss.

Undoubtedly, the German theologian at whose feet Hare sat most attentively, almost in worshipful adoration, was Schleiermacher. Hare had met Schleiermacher (along with A. W. Schlegel and Barthold Niebuhr) in Bonn in the summer of 1828, just before Schleiermacher's visit to England. Later, in *Guesses at Truth* (1838), which Julius Hare co-authored with Augustus, the two brothers left this testimony to Schleiermacher's memory:

All who knew him well declare that the basis of his character, the keynote of his whole being, was love;—and so, when I had the happiness of seeing him, I felt it to be;—a love which delighted in pouring out the boundless riches of his spirit for the edifying of such as came near him, and strove with unweariable zeal to make them partakers of all that he had.<sup>136</sup>

Visitors at Herstmonceux Rectory would find the Archdeacon's massive library of over twelve thousand works dominated by a large bust of Schleiermacher, and when

Hare died, among his three thousand German volumes, there were seventy either by or about Schleiermacher, including three editions of this theologian's collected works.<sup>137</sup>

Only S. T. Coleridge, among English authors, came near to occupying so revered a position among Hare's small band of heroes. I have tried to account for this reverence in my book *The Broad Church: A Biography of a Movement* (2003), but the simplest explanation may be found in the words of the Bampton lecturer of 1885, the future Dean of Canterbury, F. W. Farrar:

Fifty years ago the Shibboleth of popular orthodoxy was the indiscriminate anathema of "German theology." If in later days the Church of England has made an immense advance, the progress is perhaps more due to Samuel Taylor Coleridge than to any ordained or professional theologian. He helped to deliver English Churchmen from their ignorance of German literature, and their terror of German speculation.<sup>138</sup>

## Notes

1. Letters to Friedrich Schleiermacher, 7 May 1790 and 3 December 1792, in *The Life of Schleiermacher: As Unfolded in His Autobiography and Letters*, trans. Frederica Rowan, 2 vols. (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1860), 1: 85, 104.

2. Richard Whately, *On Some of the Difficulties in the Writings of the Apostle Paul*, 1825 (London: John W. Parker, 1849), 29. Robert Southey, in his *Life of Wesley*, observes that when John Wesley confessed to Boehler, the Moravian, his reluctance to preach without a conviction of certain faith, the response he received was, "Preach faith till you have it, and then because you have it you will preach faith" (Alfred William Benn, *The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century*, 2 vols. [New York: Russell and Russell, 1962], 1: 268).

3. Matthew Arnold, "Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse," lines 85-6, in *Matthew Arnold*, ed. Miriam Allott and Robert H. Super (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986), 159-65.

4. Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede* (1906), trans. F. C. Burkitt (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1998), 15.

5. Karl Barth, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century: Its Background & History* (1946; Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1973), 248-49.

6. Qtd. in Schweitzer, 16.

7. E. B. Pusey, *An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately Predominant in the Theology of Germany* (London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828), 51n.

8. This event took place in August 1781, in Seville, and was witnessed by the six-year-old Joseph Blanco White, whose recollections are given in his *Letter upon the Mischievous Influence of the Inquisition* (1811). The victim “was a blind and deranged woman who was charged with having seduced a succession of spiritual directors and with claiming private revelations and dispensations from the moral law.” On account of her last-minute repentance, she was strangled before her body was burned on the pyre (Martin Murphy, *Blanco White: Self-Banished Spaniard* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 5).

9. Barth, 248.

10. Schleiermacher, “Autobiography,” in *Life*, 1: 1-18, 2.

11. *The Athenäum*, edited by F. D. Maurice and John Sterling, has an interesting article on “Herrnhut” by “E. D.” (69 [February 1829]: 108-09).

12. John Keble, *The Life of the Most Reverend Father in God, Thomas Wilson, D.D., Lord Bishop of Sodor and Man* (Oxford: John Henry Parker), 1863, 941-45; see also John H. Overton and Frederic Relton, *The English Church from the Accession of George I to the End of the Eighteenth Century* (London: Macmillan and Co, Ltd., 1906), 355-57.

13. Letter from Gottlieb Schleiermacher to the Mr. Stubenrauch, n.d., *Life*, 1: 23-4.

14. Letter from Schleiermacher to His Sister Charlotte, 22 December 1783, *Life*, 1: 35.

15. Schleiermacher, “Autobiography,” *Life*, 1: 6-7.

16. This classical allusion to the friendship of Orestes and Pylades, a friendship made proverbial in Euripides’s drama, would have at this time carried with it certain connotations both modern and romantic, since Goethe, in 1786, had published his own verse drama *Iphigenia in Tauris*—“perhaps the most perfect Drama ever composed” (Henry Crabb Robinson, Letter of 13 January 1802, in *Crabb Robinson in Germany, 1800-1805*, ed. Edith J. Morley [London: Oxford University Press, 1929], 98).

17. Albertini graduated from the Moravian seminary and subsequently became a bishop. Okely, who left the Brethren at the same time as Schleiermacher, shortly thereafter drowned. Thirteen years later, Schleiermacher wrote to the spirit of Okely, “Never has my heart forsaken you” (*Soliloquies*, trans. Horace Leland Friess [Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1926], 85).

18. *Ibid.*, 11-12; cf. Letter from Schleiermacher to His Father, n.d., *Life*, 1: 44.

19. Letter of Gottlieb Schleiermacher to His Son, 12 August 1786, *Life*, 1: 45.

20. Letter from Schleiermacher to His Father, 21 January 1787, *Life*, 1: 46-8.

21. Letter from Gottlieb Schleiermacher to His Son, 6 February 1787, *Life*, 1: 50-3.

22. Letter from Schleiermacher to His Father, n.d., *Life*, 1:56.

23. Pusey, 6-9.

24. For this information on Bahrtdt’s teaching I am indebted to Schweitzer, 39-41.

25. Mark Pattison, “F. A. Wolf,” *North British Review* (June 1865), rpt. in *Essays by the Late Mark Pattison, Sometime Rector of Lincoln College*, ed. Henry Nettleship, 2 vols. (London: Clarendon Press, 1889), 1: 337-414, esp. 317, 358-59.

26. The German orientalist and theologian Heinrich E. G. Paulus (1761-1851) would publish his German edition of Spinoza’s writings, along with a biography, in 1803.

27. Letters from Gottlieb Schleiermacher to His Son, n.d., and from Schleiermacher to His Father, August 1787, in *Life*, 1: 66, 68-9.
28. For a more complete discussion of Schleiermacher's criticism of Kant, see Richard B. Brandt's *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 23-32.
29. Julia A. Lamm, *The Living God: Schleiermacher's Theological Appropriation of Spinoza* (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), 42.
30. Schleiermacher, "Autobiography," 15.
31. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Father, 15 May 1791, *Life*, 1: 88.
32. Friedrich D. E. Schleiermacher, *Soliloquies: A New Year's Gift*, trans. Horace Leland Friess (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1926), 28-9.
33. *Ibid.*, 31.
34. Letter of Schleiermacher to Eleonore Grunow, 1802, *Life*, 1: 330.
35. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Father, 19 June, 1793, *Life*, 1: 118.
36. Lamm, p. 15.
37. Letter of Gottlieb Schleiermacher to His Son, 3 July 1794, *Life*, 1: 127.
38. *Ibid.*, 1: 133.
39. The Wednesday Society came to represent the new Berlin intellectual movement and spirit in contradistinction to the older Berlin literary school as represented by the Monday Society, the leading lights of which were Otto Nicolai, Gotthold Lessing, and Moses Mendelssohn (Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Schleiermacher Biography," in *Selected Writings*, trans. and ed. H. P. Rickman [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976], 37-77, 69-70). Among the Ashkenazim of Germany, Mendelssohn had been the foremost figure in the birth of Haskala, a renaissance movement for Jewish self-enlightenment and the re-appropriation of European culture, opposed to Hasidism. To the extent that it was Jewish, the Wednesday society, characteristically modern and more diverse, should be recognized as a further development of Haskala.
40. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Sister Charlotte, 4 August 1798, *Life*, 1: 178.
41. Horace Leland Friess, Introduction to Schleiermacher's *Soliloquies*, xi-lviii; xxxiv.
42. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Sister Charlotte, 22 October 1797, *Life*, 1: 158-59.
43. *Soliloquies*, 36, 34.
44. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Sister Charlotte, 21 November 1797, *Life*, 1: 162-63.
45. Novalis, *Schriften*, iv. 247-49; qtd. in Thomas McFarland, *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 103-04.
46. Friedrich Schlegel was the first to coin the term "Romantic" in an effort to define the movement that has, even since, borne this name.
47. Barth, 441.
48. At about the same time as Schleiermacher's departure from Berlin, Johann Fichte was dismissed on account of "atheism" from his post as Professor of Philosophy at Jena. On invitation from Friedrich Schlegel, Fichte visited Berlin during Schleiermacher's absence and wrote *The Vocation of Man*.
49. Letter of Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz, 22 February 1799, *Life*, 1: 189.

50. Friedrich Schleiermacher, "First Speech: Defence," in *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. John Oman, 1893 (Louisville: Westminster / John Knox Press, 1994), 2-21; 4-6.
51. *Ibid.*, 18.
52. Schleiermacher, "Second Speech: The Nature of Religion," in *On Religion*, 26-101; 36.
53. *Ibid.*, 37.
54. *Ibid.*, 39.
55. *Ibid.*, 49-50.
56. *Ibid.*, 50-5.
57. *Ibid.*, 72.
58. *Ibid.*, 39; italics mine.
59. *Ibid.*, 40.
60. Friedrich Schlegel, "Athenäum Fragments" 234, in *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 50.
61. Schleiermacher, "Second Speech," 48.
62. *Ibid.*, 97.
63. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Briefe*, 1.187-88; trans. Albert L. Blackwell in "The Antagonistic Correspondence of 1801 between Chaplain Sack and His Protégé Schleiermacher," *Harvard Theological Review* 74 (1981): 101-21, 106.
64. Barth, 434.
65. Letter of Schleiermacher to Henrietta Herz, 4 July 1799, in *Life* 1: 223.
66. George Pattison, "Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde*: A Case Study in the Relation of Religion to Romanticism," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 38 (1985): 545-64, 548.
67. Letter of Friedrich Sack to Schleiermacher, trans. Blackwell in "The Antagonistic Correspondence," 113-14.
68. Letter of Schleiermacher to Friedrich Sack, op. cit., 117.
69. Schleiermacher, *Soliloquies*, 102.
70. Schleiermacher wrote, on 19 January 1802, in a letter to his sister Charlotte, "Willich possesses all that which I miss in Schlegel" (*Life* 1: 279).
71. Letter of Schleiermacher to Friedrich Sack, trans. Blackwell, 118; italics mine.
72. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 97.4, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), 411.
73. *Ibid.*, 172.2., 749.
74. Barth, 442-43.
75. In his memorable analogy, Schweitzer compares Schleiermacher to "a spider at work. The spider lets itself down from aloft, and after making fast some supporting threads to points below, it runs back to the centre and there keeps spinning away. You look on fascinated, and before you know it, you are entangled in the web" (Schweitzer 62).
76. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation*, trans. Terrence N. Tice (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1967), 79-80.
77. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 91.3., 382.

78. Ibid., 118.1., 540.
79. Letter of Schleiermacher to George Reimer, 30 April 1802, *Life*, 1: 283-84.
80. Letter of Schleiermacher to Charlotte von Kathen, 5 May 1805, Ibid., 2: 22-4.
81. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 139.2., 640-41.
82. Letter of Schleiermacher to Charlotte von Kathen, 31 December 1807, *Life*, 2: 98.
83. Letter of Henriette von Willich to Schleiermacher, 13 March 1807, Ibid., 2: 78.
84. Letter of Schleiermacher to Henriette von Willich, 25 March 1807, Ibid., 2: 80-1. F. D. Maurice received a similar letter, requesting assurances, from a woman after the death of her father. Maurice's response characteristically emphasizes the incarnation: "Souls may fly off, perhaps, as the hymns tell us, to distant worlds, to unknown spheres. We may think anything we like about such winged creatures; they have nothing to do with us. But the spirits of those we have loved and cared for . . . cannot be changed into birds or butterflies. They must be still human, the more they have entered into converse with the Divine. And why must we force ourselves into the conception of them as without bodies?" (*The Life of Frederick Denison Maurice, Chiefly Told in His Own Letters*, ed. Frederick Maurice, 2 vols. [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884], 2: 623-24).
85. Terrence N. Tice, Editor's Introduction to *Luke: A Critical Study* by Friedrich Schleiermacher (Lampeter: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1993), 2.
86. Dilthey, 43.
87. Hans Küng, *Great Christian Thinkers*, trans. John Bowden (New York: Continuum, 1994), 173.
88. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 14.2., 70.
89. Ibid., 17.1., 83.
90. Ibid., 4.2-4., 13-17.
91. Ibid., 30.1., 126.
92. Küng, 168.
93. Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, 32.2., 132.
94. Ibid., 8.Postscript 2., 39.
95. Henry Longueville Mansel, *The Limits of Religious Thought Examined*, American ed. (Boston: Gould and Lincoln, 1860), 124.
96. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1923), 10.
97. Ibid., 5-7, 10-11.
98. Richard R. Niebuhr, *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion* (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1965), 194 and note.
99. Selbie, W. B., *Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study* (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1913), 29.
100. Frederick Denison Maurice, *What Is Revelation?* (Cambridge: Macmillan and Co., 1859), 295-96.
101. Schweitzer, 70; Barth, 426.
102. Charles Wordsworth, *Annals of My Early Life, 1806-1846* (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1891), 144-45.

103. *Ibid.*, 147.
104. Schweitzer, 71.
105. *Life*, 2: 335-39.
106. Wordsworth, 148.
107. *Life*, 1: 341.
108. Schleiermacher, *On Religion*, 9-10.
109. J. J. Conybeare, *An Attempt to Trace the History and To Ascertain the Limits of the Secondary and Spiritual Interpretation of Scripture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1824), 7.
110. *Ibid.*, 21, 27-35.
111. Hugh James Rose, *The State of Protestantism in Germany, Described; Being the Substance of Four Discourses Preached before the University of Cambridge in 1825*, 2nd ed. (London: C. J. G. and F. Rivington, 1829), 1.
112. *Ibid.*, 6.
113. *Ibid.*, 88.
114. *Ibid.*, 33.
115. *Diary of Henry Crabb Robinson*, 3 vols. (London, 1869), 3: 90; qtd. in Ieuan Ellis, "Schleiermacher in Britain," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 33 (1980): 417-52, 423.
116. Tice, 12.
117. Maurice, *What Is Revelation?*, 292; F. D. Maurice, Letter to Caroline Fox, 25 February 1848, in Maurice, *Life*, 1: 453-54.
118. Henry Parry Liddon, *Life of Edward Bouverie Pusey*, ed. J. O. Johnstron and Robert J. Wilson (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1893), 1: 70-85, esp. 82-4; Ellis, 420-21.
119. "Letter from Professor Sack to the Author," in E. B. Pusey, *An Historical Enquiry into the Probable Causes of the Rationalist Character lately Predominate in the Theology of Germany* (London: C. and J. Rivington, 1828), i-xv.
120. Pusey, 115. Adam Storey Farrar, in his Bampton Lectures of 1862, also identifies Schleiermacher as the leading figure in Germany's period of theological reconstruction, dating from 1800 to 1835 (*A Critical History of Free Thought in Reference to the Christian Religion* [London: John Murray, 1862], 307-08, 343-44).
121. *Ibid.*, 7-22.
122. *Ibid.*, 28-34.
123. *Ibid.*, 124-25.
124. Julius Charles Hare, *Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness against Thy Neighbour: A Letter to the Editor of the English Review* (London: John W. Parker, 1849), 49-50, 54-5.
125. Schleiermacher's wife's cousin, Ludwig von Muhlenfels, after having been arrested in Prussia on charges of "demagoguery," had escaped and fled from imprisonment to England. Through the mediation of the Prussian consul, Schleiermacher was able to use his influence to have Muhlenfels's case reviewed. Two years later the charges were dismissed (Ellis, 417).
126. Letter of Schleiermacher to Charlotte von Kathen, 4 September 1828, in *Life*, 2: 315.

127. Letter of Schleiermacher to His Wife, n.d., *Ibid.*, 2: 317; Ellis, 419. Thirlwall and Grote, both accomplished classical scholars, wrote rival Histories of Greece; Thirlwall's eight volumes appeared in the years 1835-44, Grote's twelve volumes in the years 1846-56.

128. *Ibid.*, 11.

129. *Ibid.*, 3; cf. Alexander Roper Vidler, *F. D. Maurice and Company: Nineteenth Century Studies* (London: SCM, 1966), 236.

130. A. P. Stanley, in the *Quarterly Review*, July 1855, observes, "If any foreigner landing in England in 1853 had asked where he should find the man best acquainted with all modern forms of thought here or on the Continent—where he should find the most complete collection of the philosophical, theological, or historical literature of Germany," he should have been directed away from London and the universities, to Hurstmonceaux ("Archdeacon Hare," in *Essays Chiefly on Questions of Church and State* [London: John Murray, 1870], 536-71, 537).

131. Augustus J. C. Hare, *Memorials of a Quiet Life*, 2 vols. (New York: George Routledge and Sons, n.d.), 1: 195.

132. J. J. Steward Perowne and Louis Stokes, eds., *Letters Literary and Theological by ... Connop Thirlwall* (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1881), 74; Anthony John Harding, *Coleridge and the Inspired Word* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1985), 101.

133. Ellis, 432.

134. Letter of John Sterling to J. C. Hare; ca. December 1836, in "Sketch of the Author's Life," Julius Charles Hare, *Essays and Tales, by John Sterling*, 2 vols. (London: John W. Parker, 1848), 1: i-ccxxxii, xcvi-xcvi.

135. Thomas Carlyle, *The Life of John Sterling* (1851; New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1901), Pt. II, Ch. 3, 121.

136. *Guesses at Truth, by Two Brothers* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1878), 254-55.

137. Augustus J. C. Hare, *Memorials*, 2:75-6. In *The Story of My Life* (1896-1900), A. J. C. Hare states that the number of volumes was over fourteen thousand (*Peculiar People: The Story of My Life*, ed. Anita Miller and James Papp [Chicago: Academy Chicago Publishers, 1995], 11); Ellis, 432.

138. Frederick W. Farrar, *History of Interpretation* (Oxford, 1885; rpt. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1961), 422.